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1. Executive Summary 
The FutureID Client is an intelligent software component for the user which provides the user 
with support and information. The main legal obligation with regard to the Client is that the user 
must receive relevant information. This information needs to be provided by the controller in the 
sense of Directive 95/46/EC. It is not possible to conclude only from the technical settings who 
will be controller(s), and in which regard (joint or separate). Who is controller and processor can 
only be decided from the final deployment of FutureID. To approach this problem in a 
differentiated manner we used in this deliverable different scenarios as basis and explained the 
implications of these scenarios.  
The different scenarios are that either the SP and the FutureID Broker are controllers, or that the 
SP is a controller and the FutureID Broker a processor, or finally that there is no FutureID Broker 
as a separate legal entity, and the SP is the controller. The requirements for adequate 
information provision and obtaining consent are explained while showing the implication of the 
different scenarios. Afterwards, possible implementations of the data protection requirements 
with regard to the Client are shown at the hand of the different steps/phases of the User 
Interface of the Client. A special focus is put on the way the information is provided that the user 
should receive.  
In the second part of this deliverable, we assess the national legislation in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Austria. This is done with a focus on possible legal restrictions, 
especially with regard to the use of national identifiers.  
The examples of Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands show that the national prohibitions of the 
use of unique identification numbers outside of e-government can present an obstacle to the use 
of national eID means in the FutureID system. Therefore, every FutureID Broker must verify 
which eID means they can support. To achieve a complete service they might need to work 
together and make contracts with other FutureID Brokers, or credential transformers which 
support different eID means. The German example shows that the FutureID Broker might need 
to take into account different restrictions and obligations when providing service for specific 
authentication means.  
The analysis also shows that the national legislation can vary a lot. The proposed Data 
Protection Regulation will potentially provide harmonization in this regard. However, the current 
proposal does not harmonize the specific conditions for the processing of a national identification 
number or any other identifier of general application. Therefore, specific national legislation will 
still apply after the introduction of the Data Protection Regulation, while outside the applicable 
national law, the general data protection provisions will apply.  
Finally Regulation (EU) 910/2014 (eIDAS Regulation), which includes the development of an 
interoperability framework and encourages governments to make their eID schemes more cross-
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border friendly, can be positive for FutureID. The influence of the eIDAS Regulation might help 
to lower the legal and technical hurdles and increase the amount of possible eID means that 
FutureID Brokers can support.  
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4. Project Description 
The FutureID project builds a comprehensive, flexible, privacy-aware and ubiquitously usable 
identity management infrastructure for Europe, which integrates existing eID technology and 
trust infrastructures, emerging federated identity management services and modern credential 
technologies to provide a user-centric system for the trustworthy and accountable management 
of identity claims.  
The FutureID infrastructure will provide great benefits to all stakeholders involved in the eID 
value chain. Users will benefit from the availability of a ubiquitously usable open source eID 
client that is capable of running on arbitrary desktop PCs, tablets and modern smart phones. 
FutureID will allow application and service providers to easily integrate their existing services 
with the FutureID infrastructure, providing them with the benefits from the strong security offered 
by eIDs without requiring them to make substantial investments.  
This will enable service providers to offer this technology to users as an alternative to 
username/password based systems, providing them with a choice for a more trustworthy, usable 
and innovative technology. For existing and emerging trust service providers and card issuers 
FutureID will provide an integrative framework, which eases using their authentication and 
signature related products across Europe and beyond.  
To demonstrate the applicability of the developed technologies and the feasibility of the overall 
approach FutureID will develop two pilot applications and is open for additional application 
services who want to use the innovative FutureID technology 
Future ID is a three-year duration project funded by the European Commission Seventh 
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 318424 
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5. Outline and scope  
This deliverable provides a comprehensive analysis of the legal framework surrounding the 
FutureID Client, with particular attention to issues of data protection and national restrictions on 
the use of eID credentials. As it is impossible to assess the compliance of one component 
without taking the bigger picture into account, our analysis includes how the relevant data 
protection principles relate to the FutureID ecosystem.  
The FutureID Client “runs as a middleware between the credential and the identity infrastructure 
and provides the User Interface, the security and communication protocols, and the application 
flow.”1 The FutureID client enables among other things authentication services supporting 
various authentication tokens.2 Therefore it is the component closest to the user. As such, it 
should incorporate the technical and organisational measures to support data protection 
compliance. Where appropriate, consideration should also be given to expected changes 
resulting from the forthcoming Data Protection Regulation. Finally, the new eIDAS Regulation 
has been analysed and provisions which could be of interest for the Client are indicated.3  
In order to consider national differences and restrictions on the use of eID credentials, 4 country 
reports on countries with different eID solutions have been conducted, namely Belgium, Austria, 
the Netherlands and Germany.  
The structure of the document is as follows: first it introduces the FutureID ecosystem and its 
different stakeholders. Then it will be described how the Client might be deployed in practice, 
and the different actors involved are described. We then discuss three possible modes of 
implementation. These three cases will be used throughout the document to exemplify the 
different possibilities with regard to the possible responsibility of each actor involved. Next the 
authentication with the FutureID Client will be analysed at the hand of the different steps the 
user is aware of in the User Interface. Following the structure of 34.2, we point out the legal 
implications. Finally country reports on Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany provide 
insight into the eID systems and legal provisions of the different countries. This part also 
exemplifies the potential national legal barriers.   
The scope of our analysis is confined to the processing activities relating directly to FutureID 
technology. Our analysis does not extend to the prior issuance of credentials. Nor does it extend 
to the subsequent use of data in the hand of the SP, as context-specific considerations take an 
important role.  
                                               
 
1
 D32.3, p.1.  
2
 D32.3, p.1.  
3
 A comprehensive analysis of the eIDAS Regulation can be found in 10.5.1 and in D33.6. 
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 17 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
6. Actors 
The following stakeholders of the FutureID ecosystem are relevant for this deliverable.4 
(1) Users,  
(2) Credential Issuers (CI),  
(3) FutureID Brokers, 
(4) Service Providers (SP). 
(1) The Users are the persons who use the authentication service provided by FutureID. They 
choose the credential to present and the intermediaries between them and the SP. Users are 
supported in this by an intelligent software component that acts in their interest. This component 
can either be the FutureID client that is installed on the user’s platform or alternatively a remote 
service chosen by the user and provided by the FutureID Broker, that runs remotely or as 
JavaScript in the user’s browser. 
(2) Credential issuers (CI) are the authoritative sources that make statements on one or more 
attribute values of a user and issue credentials. Different types of enrolment are possible: offline 
and online enrolment; and different types of identities: they can range from identities certified by 
authority (highly trusted environment) to self-claimed reputation based identities. Neither the 
software components used by credential issuers, nor credentials themselves are designed by 
the FutureID project. Instead, the FutureID ecosystem foresees to use existing issuers and 
credentials.   
(3) FutureID Brokers serve as intermediaries in the authentication process and transform the 
original user credential to a form that is acceptable to the chosen Service Provider. Next to 
FutureID Brokers also another type of credential transformers can exist in the FutureID 
ecosystem, namely existing (legacy) Identity Providers. However, only FutureID Brokers use 
technology designed by the FutureID project. FutureID Brokers are more capable than legacy 
Identity Providers in as much as they can convert format and semantics, filter out information, 
derive information (e.g. take a date of birth and state that the person is older than 18) and can 
combine attributes.  The term Broker Service (BS) refers to the main software component that is 
operated by the legal entity FutureID Broker.   
  
(4) Service Providers (SP) are relying parties. They receive a credential directly from the user or 
from a FutureID Broker and use this to authenticate the user and make an access decision. 
They shall say who they trust (user credentials, CTs) and can use the information of the TSA to 
assess this. Most likely there will be a contract between the SP and the Identity Broker(s) the SP 
chooses and trusts.  
                                               
 
4
 Other stakeholders are the (legacy) identity providers and TSAs.  
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7.  Relationships 
The FutureID infrastructure, i.e., the set of all FutureID components configures itself dynamically 
for every authentication process. Therefore every authentication process may involve a different 
chain of intermediaries (FutureID Brokers and legacy IdPs). Which intermediaries are actually 
used is decided by the user with assistance from an intelligent user component (the Client), 
within the boundaries of the acceptance of the SP.  
The flexibility implies that for every data processing different parties can be involved. In principle, 
it can be either the user and the SP, or the user and one or more intermediaries (IdPs and 
FutureID Brokers) and the SP. The contractual relationships will be analysed further in D41.6). In 
this deliverable we will have a closer look at the data processing relationships of the different 
legal persons.  
 Relationship FutureID Broker – Service Provider 7.1
The SP determines which credential issuers/credentials and FutureID Brokers it trusts. It can 
accept user credentials directly (eventually with its own BS component) or session credentials 
from a subset of trusted FutureID Brokers. We assume that the SP will have a contractual 
relationship with the FutureID Brokers with which it has direct contact, and this contractual 
relationship, among others, ensures that only trusted credentials and credential transformers are 
used (see further D41.6).  
The service which the FutureID Broker provides for the SP can vary. It can transform the 
credentials into a form that is acceptable to the SP. However, it can also provide further services 
such as e.g. deriving information (e.g. take a date of birth and state that the person is older than 
18) and combining attributes. It is possible that the contracted FutureID Brokers, in turn, can 
establish relationships with further FutureID Brokers in order to achieve a more complete service 
offering towards SPs. The FutureID Broker will most likely not be able to control the data 
protection practices of the SP. However, it could be possible to impose a number of safeguards 
in the contracts between the parties.5 
 Relationship FutureID Broker - User 7.2
The purpose of the FutureID Client is to help users to authenticate themselves. Since it is 
possible that several FutureID Brokers will be involved in one authentication process, it could be 
that the user has its own trusted FutureID Broker, which has a contractual relationship with the 
FutureID Broker that the SP trusts (or with another (or several) Brokers, which then in turn have 
                                               
 
5
 See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, 
68, 29.1.2003, p.9 on the requirements for Microsoft Passport.  
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a relationship with one that the SP trusts). However, for purposes of conceptual clarity we will 
generally assume that only one FutureID Broker will be involved.  
In order to authenticate oneself, the user must have one or more credentials. This can for 
example be a national eID card but can also be a self-claimed reputation-based identity such as 
Facebook or LinkedIN. The available credentials form the basis for the available authentication 
possibilities. Depending on how the exact authentication of the user via FutureID takes place, 
the FutureID Broker might need to conclude contracts with the CI or credential transformers for 
their authentication service, and must adhere to their API terms and conditions.  
 
 Legal qualification 7.3
Directive 95/46/EC defines different actors, of which at least two are always involved in a 
personal data processing operation: the data subject and the controller. Occasionally a data 
processor can be involved. The Controller is defined by art. 2 d as a “natural or legal person, 
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the 
purposes and means of the processing of personal data”. The Processor is defined in art. 2 e as 
“any natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller”.6  
 Controller or processor? 7.3.1
It is important to understand who is controller and who is processor, since the allocation of 
responsibilities relates to this division. These notions are at the basis of Directive 95/46/EC, but 
technological developments since the enactment of the Directive have made it difficult to apply 
the distinction in practice.7 Whether an entity is a controller or a processor is not based on the 
nature of the entity which processes data, but on its concrete activities in a specific context. The 
same entity may act at the same time as a controller for certain processing operations and as a 
processor for others, the qualification as controller or processor should be assessed with regard 
to specific sets of data or operations.8 
The two basic conditions for a processor are9: It must be a separate legal entity, different from 
the controller, and it must process personal data on behalf of the controller. This processing may 
                                               
 
6
 The notion of controller and processor has been kept in the draft Data Protection Regulation. 
7
 B. Van Alsenoy, N. Vandezande, Dr. K. Janssen, A. Kuczerawy, E. Kindt, Prof. Dr. J. Dumortier, H. 
Leitold, B. Zwattendorfer and Dr. I. Krontiris, „Legal Provisions for Deploying INDI Services”, GINI 
Deliverable 3.1, 05.10.2011, p. 14.  
8
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”, 
169, 16.02.2010, p. 25. 
9
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and “processor”, 
169, 16.02.2010, p. 25.  
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be limited to a very specific task or context or may be more general and extended. Two 
provisions of Directive 95/46/EC are specifically addressed to the processor: art. 16 Directive 
95/46/EC provides the processor must not process data unless on instructions from the 
controller; and art. 17 Directive 95/46/EC states the need for a contract or a binding legal act 
regulating the relationship between data controller and data processor. This contract provides 
the description of the mandate of the processor in writing. It should include - as a minimum - the 
stipulation that the processor may only act upon instructions from the controller and that the 
processor must implement technical and organizational measures to adequately protect 
personal data. However, the requirement of a written contract does not mean there cannot be a 
controller/processor relationship without a prior contract. 
The controller on the other hand is the entity which, as art. 2d phrases it “determines the 
purposes and means” of the processing. In relation to the processed data one controller can be 
involved, but it is as well possible that several controllers have different gradations of joint 
control. Joint control arises according to the Article 29 Working Party when different parties 
together determine with regard to specific processing operations either the purpose or those 
essential elements of the means which characterize a controller.10 The participation of the 
parties must not necessarily be equally shared. However, to speak of joint control it is important 
that the two or more controllers share purposes and means in a common set of operations. 
Without this, different entities cooperating in processing personal data, for example in a chain, 
could be considered a transfer of data between separate controllers.11  
In practice, it is often difficult to assess whether an entity is acting as a controller or processor. 
This problem is well illustrated by the report of the Article 29 Working Party on the STORK 
project.12 The STORK project aims to establish a European eID Interoperability Platform, which 
allows citizen to use their national eID in order to establish cross-border e-relations. To provide 
the interoperability, 2 systems are developed. One is a middleware system where specific 
software components ensure the possibility of the SP to directly communicate with the users 
eID, and the other a proxy system, in which the identity data exchange takes place through 
specific national proxies, called Pan-European Proxy Services (PEPS). The PEPS act as an 
intermediary for foreign eIDs towards its domestic Service Providers, while the authentication 
takes place at the country where the eID has been issued.13 Similarities exist between the PEPS 
                                               
 
10
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and 
“processor”, 169, 16.02.2010, p. 19. 
11
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and 
“processor”, 169, 16.02.2010, p. 19. The notion of joint control has been taken up and codified in the Draft 
Data Protection Regulation (art. 24 of the text adopted by Parliament).  
12 Written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, 
Ref. Ares(2011)424406 - 15/04/2011.  
13
 Written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, 
Ref. Ares(2011)424406 - 15/04/2011, p.3.  
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 21 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
model and the Identity Broker approach of FutureID and therefore the advice of the Article 29 
Working Party is relevant for FutureID. It is clear that the SP should be considered a controller, 
since it processes the data for its own purposes. However, the Article 29 Working Party does not 
come to a definitive conclusion regarding the status of PEPS as controller or processor.  
“In the PEPS model it can be argued that the PEPS (pan European proxy service) is a data 
controller as far as the electronic identity management is concerned. He processes personal data, 
transfers them to another PEPS and also handles the replies (signed IDs or rejection). Although 
the PEPS is a service provided to different institutions (service providers “SP” in the figures 
above), these are not in control of what happens in the PEPS. The only thing a SP provider is in 
control of is to either accept or refuse the offer of a PEPS provider.  
It can also be argued that the service provider (SP) as controller of the service provided to the 
citizen chooses to use the services of a PEPS and therefore the PEPS is only a processor acting on 
behalf of the service provider (SP). This interpretation has one practical disadvantage from the 
point of view of the aim of reducing administrative burdens. If a PEPS is considered as processor 
this creates a significant number of controllers of this PEPS (all that use this PEPS). As a 
consequence all this controllers will have to notify the PEPS as one of their data processings.”14 
 
In its report regarding STORK, the Article 29 Working Party advises that “controllers who use a 
PEPS and provider of PEPS services will have to decide if they consider themselves as 
controller or processor under the Directive 95/46 and contact their national Data Protection 
Authority to confirm this, for example during a notification procedure.”15 This approach can 
likewise be advised for a FutureID Broker. Therefore we will specify three different possible 
scenarios how the roles of controller and processor could be allocated, but the final decision will 
have to be made by the FutureID Broker and SP themselves, and confirmed during the 
notification to their national DPAs.  
 
 Scenarios 7.4
In FutureID the data subject is the user of the authentication service. With regard to controller 
and processor, in principle three different scenarios can be distinguished: 
                                               
 
14
 Written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, 
Ref. Ares(2011)424406 - 15/04/2011,p. 6.  
15
 Written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, 
Ref. Ares(2011)424406 - 15/04/2011,p.7.  
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Figure 1 Three scenarios 
1. FutureID Broker acts as a controller: A scenario where the Broker service will be 
provided by a separate legal entity, which can also assist users that do not have a Client 
which supports the user. In this case it could in addition provide an account for the user 
to store preferences. This entity determines its own purposes and means and therefore 
the FutureID Broker acts as a controller. 
2. FutureID Broker acts as a processor: in this scenario the service will in principle be 
provided by a separate legal entity, but this entity has contracts with the SP/several 
different SPs to work as a processor for them, and acts on instructions of the SP. In this 
scenario the FutureID Broker acts as a processor.  
3. A third scenario with no separate legal entity and the authentication service will be 
provided by the SP.  
Even though it is not possible to determine the precise allocation of responsibilities before the 
final deployment, considering the basic scenarios defined before, some basic premises can be 
utilised:  
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In general the SP will be a controller in all scenarios since the SP will mainly decide on the 
purpose and on the means of the data processing, as they are the ones who will receive the 
data for their own purposes.  
In scenario 3, there exists no separate FutureID Broker but the BS is part of the SP. Accordingly 
only the SP is the controlling entity, therefore the SP is the controller.  
If a separate FutureID Broker exists, the SP will still be a controller, but it depends on the 
contracts and the amount of control the SP and the FutureID Broker have over the data 
processing whether the FutureID Broker can also be considered data controller or is a data 
processor (scenario 1 & 2). If for example the entity spontaneously solicits the user to open an 
account and to provide personal data, the legal entity will be a controller since it will decide on 
the purposes and means of the processing.  
If the FutureID Broker can be considered controller (scenario 1) it will still depend on the specific 
situation whether it is a case of joint control or two separate data controllers. If the SP and 
FutureID Broker together determine the essential elements to be used they qualify as joint data 
controllers. If this is not the case, they are two separate controllers with their own purposes and 
only transfer the data between them.  
This still holds true in case of several involved FutureID Brokers, depending on who controls the 
means and decides the purpose it can be decided whether they are controller or processor. 
The Article 29 Working Party listed several helpful criteria to determine whether an entity is 
acting as a controller or processor: 16 
o Level of prior instructions given by the data controller, which determines the margin of 
manoeuvre left to the data processor   
o Monitoring by the data controller of the execution of the service. A constant and careful 
supervision by the controller to ensure thorough compliance of the processor with 
instructions and terms of contract provides an indication that the controller is still in full 
and sole control of the processing operations 
o Visibility/image given by the controller to the data subject, and expectations of the data 
subject on the basis of this visibility 
o Expertise of the parties: in certain cases, the traditional role and professional expertise of 
the service provider play a predominant role, which may entail its qualification as data 
controller. 
                                               
 
16
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the concepts of “controller” and 
“processor”, 169, 16.02.2010, p. 28. 
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In a final deployment of FutureID the different actors will have to assess at the hand of the 
different criteria which role they fulfil and verify this with their national DPA. According to their 
role they will have to fulfil certain requirements, especially regarding information provision and 
user rights, which will be further explained in the next section.  
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8. Main requirements relevant to the FutureID Client 
 Duty to inform 8.1
The Directive 95/46/EC requires the controller to provide information to the data subject, except 
where the user already received the information.  
In general, the essential information which must be provided to the user is17: 
(1) The identity of the controller and of his representative, if any; 
(2) The purpose of the processing for which the data are intended; 
(3) Possibly further information.  
The laws in the Member States vary with regard to the kinds of information that must be 
provided (including the kinds of additional information that should be provided to ensure a fair 
processing), the form in which it must be provided and the time at which it must be provided.18 
The information should be provided in all the languages used on the site.19  
The three scenarios shown before describe that either one controller or two (or more) controllers 
will be involved in the processing.  
Information on the identity of the controller means that the identity and physical and electronic 
address of the controller must be provided.20 In case a representative has been appointed, also 
the information on the representative should be stated. In case of two controllers (or more) the 
FutureID Broker is a controller, therefore it should provide first information about itself. The SP, 
which is likewise a controller, must provide information as well. In principle the information 
should be provided only the first time the specific personal data is requested. Afterwards it only 
needs to be provided again in case different personal data is requested, or the data is requested 
for a different purpose.  
Further the specific purpose of the processing of the personal data must be provided. In case 
of two or more controllers, both controllers must provide the purpose of the processing.   
                                               
 
17
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.2; art. 10 Directive 95/46/EC.  
18
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.3. 
19
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p.6.  
20
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p. 4.  
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Further information that should be provided is for example the existence of and conditions for 
exercising the rights to consent or to object to the processing of personal data, and the right to 
access, rectify and delete data.21 Also the user should be informed on the recipients or 
categories of recipients of the collected information and whether the data will be disclosed to 
third parties, including the reason for this disclosure. In addition, the name and (physical as well 
as electronic) address of the service or person which can be contacted in case of questions 
concerning the protection of personal data should be provided.22 Finally the level of security 
during all processing stages including transmission should be indicated.23 
 Legitimacy of processing 8.2
Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC defines the legal grounds allowing for personal data to be 
processed. As discussed in D22.6 consent will be considered the general legal ground for 
processing. This requires that before processing the personal data of the user, the controller will 
have to obtain from the user unambiguous, specific, freely given and informed consent.  
The current applicable Directive implicitly also provides the right to withdraw consent for the user 
and therefore this possibility should be implemented by the controller. The withdrawal is not 
retroactive, therefore it does not have implications for prior processing, but it should in principle 
prevent any further processing of the data of the user by the controller.24 This includes that there 
should be a mechanism how to withdraw consent, and information regarding this option. Another 
point is that the controller must provide proof of given consent, which means that he should be 
able to create and retain evidence that verifies that consent has indeed been given.25  
In case of two (or more) controllers, every controller is in principle required to obtain consent 
from the user. If the consent for the processing falls within the reasonable expectation of the 
data subject, it should be sufficient for the controllers to obtain consent only once for different 
operations.26 It is further required that the user is able, even if they e.g. have an account at the 
FutureID Broker, to communicate personal information to the SP without collection of this 
                                               
 
21
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p. 4.  
22
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p. 5.  
23
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p. 7.  
24
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 187, 
13.07.2011, p. 9.  
25
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 187, 
13.07.2011, p. 21.  
26
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 187, 
13.07.2011, p. 17.  
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additional information by the FutureID Broker.27 The user must be able to freely decide which 
data should be given to the FutureID Broker.28 
 
 
 Data Subject rights 8.3
The user must have the possibility to use the right of access. This right, specified in art. 12 
Directive 95/46/EC, states that every data subject has the right to obtain from the controller: 
(1) Confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed, 
(2) Information at least as to the purpose of the processing, the categories of the data 
concerned and the recipients or categories of recipients to whom the data are 
disclosed,  
(3) Communication to him in intelligible form of the data undergoing processing and of 
any available information as to their source, 
(4) Knowledge of the logic involved in any automatic processing of data concerning him 
at least in the case of automated decisions.  
This information should be provided without constraints, at reasonable intervals and without 
excessive delay or expense. The exact modalities on how data subjects can exercise these 
rights is specified in national legislation.  
Hand in hand with the right to access to information goes the right to request rectification, 
erasure of blocking if the data is not accurate or in another way does not comply with the 
provisions of the Directive. When the request is granted, the data subject may request that the 
controller provides notification thereof to any third party to whom the data has been disclosed, 
except if such notification would be impossible or involves disproportionate effort. In most cases 
the information on the user will be from the Credential Issuers which have a separate legal 
relation with the user, outside of the scope of FutureID. Therefore if information is not accurate 
coming from the Credential Issuers the user will have to request access to and rectification of 
the information at the Credential Issuers. 
When the FutureID Broker acts as a controller and retains user information in this capacity, it 
needs to ensure user’s rights. The SP will likewise have to ensure the right of access and 
rectification to information of the user it holds and provide information on this to the user. 
However, the fact that for example the FutureID Broker has no influence on modification and 
deletion of data at the SPs database, and likewise the SP has no influence on the FutureID 
Brokers database, might be confusing for the user. Especially since from the view of the user the 
                                               
 
27
 See  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, 
68, 29.1.2003 regarding the Microsoft Passport system. 
28
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on on-line authentication services, 68, 
29.1.2003, p.7.  
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authentication will seem to be one action, not several. Therefore the user will not know in which 
case he/she should turn to which participant of the FutureID ecosystem. For this reason a ‘no 
wrong door’ policy should be preferred as the FutureID Brokers and SPs will most likely have a 
better view on who is involved in the processing than the technological and organizational 
unaware user. In order to implement this policy, controllers have to establish beforehand which 
actor is competent to decide on which requests. At the same time it must be defined what will 
happen in case a request is granted (notification) and a procedure should be agreed upon to 
redirect requests in case the user submits a request to the wrong actor. This policy should then 
be expressed to the user. Moreover, the FutureID Client will show the agreed contact/helpdesk 
information for the user to turn to. The name and (physical as well as electronic) address of the 
service or person to be contacted in case of questions concerning the protection of personal 
data should be provided to the user.29  
                                               
 
29
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Recommendation 2/2001 on certain minimum requirements 
for collecting personal data on-line in the European Union, 43, 17.05.2001, p. 5.  
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9. Application in FutureID 
In this section we will explain the authentication steps and the related legal provisions. It will be 
shown on the basis of the steps of the User Interface as described in D34.2, since this is the part 
of FutureID that is visible to the user. We will focus on the situation where a user has a FutureID 
Client and will show possibilities on how information can be provided in an easy accessible way 
to the user. 
The challenge of FutureID is the possible complex structure of different controllers. The 
differences between the processing must be made transparent and understandable.30 A 
suggestion is to create a dedicated privacy note for every possible processing.31 However, the 
complex structure will not contribute to transparency for the user, but instead confuse the user 
on the question who is controlling the data and where to turn to in case of a complaint or the 
request of her rights. Considering that from the view of the user the whole transactions will 
probably be perceived as one single functionality it is especially important to provide the 
information in a concise and easy understandable way.32  
To provide information to a user, the Article 29 Working Party recommends in its Opinion 
10/2004 on more harmonized information provisions the use of a ‘layered notice’.33 The layered 
approach aspires that users will be provided with essential information in all circumstances in a 
concise and user-friendly manner, while further information can be obtained for example via a 
link. The Article 29 Working Party endorses the principle that it is not necessary for a fair 
processing notice to be contained in a single document.34 As long as the sum of the information 
meets legal requirements, three layers of information can be provided. In the short notice the 
core information (identity of the controller, the purposes of processing and any additional 
information that is needed to ensure fair processing) is enough. Since users at all times must be 
able to access a notice which includes all relevant information required under the Directive, the 
second layer includes next to the information on the first layer also further information as 
                                               
 
30
 Advice of the Article 29 Working Party in their written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Ref. Ares(2011)424406 – 15.04.2011, 
31
 This is an advice of the Article 29 Working Party regarding a similar problem in STORK, in: Advice of 
the Article 29 Working Party in their written report of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
Biometrics & eGovernment Subgroup, Ref. Ares(2011)424406 – 15.04.2011, p. 13. 
32
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.7.  
33
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.8. 
34
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.8.  
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explained in 8.1.35 A third layer then includes all national legal requirements and specificities. 
Here a full privacy statement can be included with possible additional links to national contact 
information.36  
One of the goals of the FutureID project is providing transparency for the user which includes 
ensuring that the user will receive the important information and be properly informed without 
having to read a detailed and complicated privacy notice. Therefore in this section we will outline 
how a possible integration of the notice requirement in the User Interface of the Client could take 
place.   
 First contact with FutureID Broker 9.1
The user will first come into contact with FutureID technology, when she either obtains the Client 
or wants to authenticate at the SP without Client by using the service of the FutureID Broker. 
Obtaining the Client can happen in different ways, depending on the specific situation and on the 
way the FutureID technology is organisationally deployed. When trying to access content at the 
SP it is possible that the User, who is still without Client, will be directed to a place to download 
the Client. This could be the website of the FutureID Broker or an open source software platform 
such as GitHub where the software has been uploaded. After the Client has been installed, it 
functions as a user-centric component and does not need to be reinstalled, but can be used for 
different authentication actions at different SPs that accept FutureID technology. In case the 
User would prefer not to download a Client, they could use the FutureID Broker without a Client, 
whereby the Client functionality will be provided by the FutureID Broker as a web service.  
In the scenario where the FutureID Broker is a controller, it is likely that the user will register first 
at the chosen FutureID Broker. The FutureID Broker as a controller should then provide during 
the registration the required information, such as the identity of the FutureID Broker, the purpose 
of the processing and possibly further information.  
 
 Starting the FutureID Client 9.2
The FutureID Client can be started in two ways: One possibility is the user trying to access a 
certain functionality at a service and the application triggers the start of the FutureID Client. The 
other possibility is the user opening the FutureID Client directly, where she sees a list of recently 
used and favourite service options which, when choosing them, will result in immediate 
                                               
 
35
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.8.  
36
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p.9.  
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 31 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
authentication at the selected service.37 If the user already has authenticated at a SP before, 
and will transfer the same personal data again, it is not necessary to provide a specific notice 
anymore. However, if that is not the case, the user should be informed.  
 Displaying Service Provider Details  9.3
When the FutureID Client has started, the user must receive certain information regarding the 
service which requires authentication. The user should be informed on the identity and the 
contact details of the controller(s), and if applicable, of the controller’s representative and of the 
data protection officer38.  
The FutureID Client should show the user the information on the controller already at the start 
page. Here in a collapsible UI element the controller’s name, web address and the purpose for 
requiring authentication (immediately visible to the user) and the service’s address and contact 
information (upon clicking) are provided.39  
In case there is only one controller the information of the SP as sole controller must be provided 
to the user. The layered approach could be used to provide the required information of the SP as 
controller to the user. One possibility is to use a common short privacy notice with all the 
essential information filled in by the SP, upon which could be agreed by contract. The advantage 
of this would be that the user will not be confused by several different privacy notices and will 
always be informed of the relevant information at the same place. The necessary information of 
the SP could be sent with SAML extensions when the SP sends the authentication request 
(FAR) to the Client.  
An example of a short notice including information of the SP would be:  
 [SP] will receive the personal information you provide via this authentication service in order to 
[purpose of the collection]. For access or correction, contact: 
[SP address, phone and e-mail information]. The full privacy notice can be found here: 
[www.exampleSP privacynotice.xy].  
In case the privacy notice is shown in the Client it should be flexible, meaning that it must be 
able to change for every involved controller. It should be possible to log at Client level and the 
user could have the possibility to download the policy in order to enable users to check at a later 
point in time the information for a specific processing. 
                                               
 
37
 A. Schuller, “Design Mockups”, FutureID Deliverable 34.2, 02.09.2013, p. 12.  
38
 Provision in the Draft Data Protection Regulation.  
39
 A. Schuller, “Design Mockups”, FutureID Deliverable 34.2, 02.09.2013, p. 13.  
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In case there are two controllers, the FutureID Broker is the first controller to whom the personal 
data will be sent, and therefore the FutureID Broker is obliged to provide the required information 
before the data is sent. This could be done during the registration of the user at the chosen 
FutureID Broker.  
 
 Selecting Credential 9.4
The Client will show to the user which credentials the user has available that can provide the 
required attributes. The user then can select his/her preferred way of authentication.  
 
 Selecting Attributes 9.5
A key aspect of the functionality of the FutureID Client is to allow the user to select which 
personal attributes will be released to the service provider.40 
The User Interface will show to the user a list of attributes required in order to use the selected 
service. The user can additionally transfer optional attributes. For every attribute the user will be 
able to see what the purpose of processing this information is. It is the controller’s responsibility 
to state the purpose of collecting these (additional) attributes.  
In case the SP is the only controller the user will only see the purpose of the processing at the 
SP. In case of two controllers with different purposes, it might be more difficult. However, if the 
FutureID Broker already informs at the registration for which purpose the data is collected, only 
the purpose information of the SP needs to be shown. The purpose information will additionally 
function as a selection criterion for the user to decide which information for which purposes 
should be made available to the SP.  
 
 Confirming Attribute Submission 9.6
In this step the user will agree with sending the selected attributes to the SP. This is important 
since the instances in which the processing of personal data may take place are restricted. 
Consent will be considered the legal ground for processing, and therefore the requirements for 
valid consent need to be fulfilled. The requirements are that the consent must be unambiguous, 
specific, freely given and informed.  
In FutureID the user can first decide which information should be sent and the Client will exactly 
show which information will be transferred if the user agrees. The user then shall click a button 
                                               
 
40
 A. Schuller, “Design Mockups”, FutureID Deliverable 34.2, 02.09.2013, p. 18.  
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to agree to the transfer of this data. This can be considered as an unambiguous and specific 
indication of the will of the data subject. The requirement of specificity includes that also in the 
more complex scenario 1 the user needs to understand the specific situation and which data will 
be processed by whom, and must agree to it. It is especially important in scenario 1 that the user 
is clearly informed that consenting includes that the data will be transferred to a third party (the 
SP), since otherwise renewed consent would be necessary for the transfer of the data.41  
 
 Displaying Communication Flows 9.7
Different possible flows of information can take place between the Client, the BS and the SP. 
The data can flow either directly from the Client to the SP, or via the BS to the SP. In principle it 
is also possible that the data arrives via several different BSs at the SP. The different data flows 
should be shown to the user and she should be informed when different FutureID Brokers are 
involved as controllers. To achieve this a good visualization is beneficial. As explained in D43.2 
the User Interface could show the flow of the information in order to provide the users with better 
insight to what is happening with their data.  
 
 Additional Information, Error Messages, Help and Contact  9.8
Finally in the User Interface the user has at all times the possibility to obtain additional 
Information, Help and Contact information. From a legal perspective it is in the first place 
important that information on how to invoke user rights will be provided to the user. For this a 
Help screen is accessible throughout the whole process, providing general usage information 
and legal information and a way to get into contact with the project.42 This legal information can 
include the notice, in a layered format. Here the 2nd and 3rd layer will be provided, since the first 
layer will already be provided to the user without any effort at the start screen and the most 
important information is available during the entire use of the Interface. 
The second and third layer include: 
2nd layer:43 
 The name of the company 
 The purpose of the data processing 
                                               
 
41
 See e.g. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of consent, 187, 
13.07.2011, p. 17.  
42
 A. Schuller, “Design Mockups”, FutureID Deliverable 34.2, 02.09.2013, p. 23.  
43
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p. 8.  
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 The recipients or categories of recipients of the data 
 Whether replies to the questions are obligatory or voluntary, including the possible 
consequences of failure to reply 
 The possibility of transfer to third parties 
 The right to access, to rectify and oppose 
 Choices available to the individual 
 Point of contact for questions and information on redress mechanisms (either within the 
company itself or details of the nearest data protection agency) 
This notice must be made available on-line and in hard copy in case of written or phone 
request.44 
3rd layer:    
In this layer, in addition to the information provided before, all national legal requirements and 
specificities must be included.45 Therefore it will depend on the location of the controller what 
exactly is required. The Article 29 Working Party informs that it may be possible to include a full 
privacy statement with possible additional links to national contact information.  
Again, it should be considered how many controllers are involved in the processing. In case of 
the FutureID Broker and the SP being the only controllers, it could be feasible to inform the user 
on both their privacy notices, in a form which easily conveys to the user which controller is 
controlling which processing operation. In case of more controllers, it would be better if the 
FutureID Broker as the trusted intermediary provides the information which other controllers are 
involved, and where their notices can be found, and stays the first point of contact and helpdesk 
in case of questions.   
                                               
 
44
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p. 9.  
45
 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2004 on More Harmonised Information Provisions, 
100, 15.11.2004, p. 9. 
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10. Country reports – potential legal barriers 
Since eID solutions are still mainly national, it is important to consider not only the European 
legal framework, but also the national eID approaches and the potential national legal 
restrictions. Especially the approach towards unique identifiers will be carefully assessed since 
many European government eIDM systems use unique identifiers that are often derived from 
national registers46. Art. 8 (7) Directive 95/46/EC provides that “Member States shall determine 
the conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general 
application may be processed.” Unique identifiers can help to ensure the accuracy of the 
processed data. They can for example ensure that information is linked to the appropriate 
account and enable (re)identification of returning users. On the other hand they form a danger to 
the privacy goal of unlinkability since a unique identifier consistently used across different 
contexts and sectors can facilitate unlawful data exchange, aggregation and profiling. For this 
reason the Member States often regulate the use of personal identification numbers.  
As it is not possible to look into the legal framework of all EU Member States in the context of 
this deliverable, 4 countries have been selected: Austria, Belgium, Germany and the 
Netherlands. Each of these countries has a different approach in relation to the use of unique 
identifiers. For each country we will provide an overview of the national eID approaches and look 
into possible legal restrictions for the use of their eID solutions in the context of FutureID. 
 
 Country report Austria 10.1
 eID credentials 10.1.1
The Austrian Citizen Card (Bürgerkarte) is not an actual card. Rather, it is a concept, which 
currently exists in two implementations. First, it can be on a smart card, such as bank cards, 
health-insurance cards, profession’s cards (i.e. Notaries or pharmacists), public officials service 
cards or student service cards of universities.47 Another option is the ‘Handy signatur’, which 
uses a mobile phone for authentication. The advantage of the ‘Handy signatur’ is that no card 
reader is needed.  
 
 
                                               
 
46
 S. Storm, “The Limits of Control – (Governmental) IDM from a Privacy Perspective” in: S. Fischer-
Hübner et al. (eds.), ‘Privacy and Identity Management for life’, Springer, 201, p. 209.  
47
 H. Graux e.a., IDABC study: eID Interoperability for PEGS: Update of Country profiles study, Austrian 
country profile, July 2009, p. 6.  
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 Overview of legislation 10.1.2
The most relevant legislation is the Federal Act on Provisions Facilitating Electronic 
Communications with Public Bodies (e-Government act (E-GovG))48. In addition, the 
Registration Act49 and the SourcePIN Register Regulation50 are important. The Registration Act 
regulates how citizens are registered in the Central Register. The SourcePIN Register 
Regulation regulates the tasks of the sourcePIN Register Authority with regard to the Citizen 
Card. The Supplementary register Regulation51 and the eGovernment Sectors Delimitation 
Regulation52 contain further restrictions and requirements. The Austrian legislator is the first in 
Europe to provide a legal basis for the acceptance of foreign eIDs by means of the e-
Government Equivalency Regulation53. The Equivalency Regulation lists which attributes are 
required in the national eID for an equivalence to the Austrian eID. Currently listed are Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, Island, Italy, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and Spain 
with their identification numbers as identifying attribute and the token providing this attribute.  
 
 Citizen Card 10.1.3
The Austrian Citizen Card is not a physical card. Rather it is a concept, a logical unit, which can 
be integrated on different tokens (e.g. a smart card or cell phone)54. To be eligible, the token 
must meet the requirements of a secure signature-creation device (SSCD) as defined in §2 (5) 
                                               
 
48
 Bundesgesetz über Regelungen zur Erleichterung des elektronischen Verkehrs mit öffentlichen Stellen 
(E-Government-Gesetz – E-GovG; BGBl. I Nr. 10/2004), can be found at www.ris.bka.gv.at 
(https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20003230). 
There is also an english version available ‘Federal Act on Provisions Facilitating Electronic 
Communications with Public Bodies’ (http://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at/site/6514/default.aspx and 
http://www.digitales.oesterreich.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=31191) but due to updates in the law this 
version can sometimes be different from the German text.  
49 Bundesgesetz über das polizeiliche Meldewesen (Meldegesetz 1991 - MeldeG), BGBl. Nr. 9/1992; 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=10005799  
50
 Verordnung des Bundeskanzlers über die Stammzahlenregisterbehörde 
(Stammzahlenregisterbehördenverordnung 2009 –StZregBehV 2009), BGBl. II 330/2009. 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20006487 
51
 Verordnung des Bundeskanzlers über das Ergänzungsregister (Ergänzungsregisterverordnung 2009 – 
ERegV 2009), BGBl. II Nr. 331/2009; 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnummer=20006490 
52
 E-Government-Bereichsabgrenzungsverordnung, BGBl. II nr. 289/2004. 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?Abfrage=BgblAuth&Dokumentnummer=BGBLA_2004_II_289  
53
 Verordnung des Bundeskanzlers, mit der die Voraussetzungen der Gleichwertigkeit  
gemäß § 6 Abs. 5 des E-Government-Gesetzes festgelegt werden  
(E-Government-Gleichwertigkeitsverordnung), BGBl. II 170/2010. 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2010_II_170/BGBLA_2010_II_170.pdf  
54
 E. Schweighofer, W. Hötzendorfer, “Electronic identities – public or private”, International Review of 
Law, Computers & Technology, 27:1-2, 230-239, 2013, p. 233. 
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of the Austrian Signature Law55. The Citizen Card contains at least a certificate in combination 
with the corresponding private key capable of issuing qualified electronic signatures (Directive 
1999/93/EC), the so-called Identity Link – a data structure that unambiguously ties a natural 
person to the public key of the afore mentioned certificate and provides the required security 
functions to interact with the middleware via the Security Layer protocol. In addition, the Citizen 
Card can also contain an additional certificate used for encryption and records about issued 
powers of representation. The latter, however, was replaced by the online mandate service. The 
Citizen Card was introduced with the eGovernment Act56.  
In case of a ‘Handy signatur, which is a qualified electronic signature via the mobile phone, the 
keys and the algorithms are managed on a secure server57 of the A-Trust GmbH, and the citizen 
identifies herself with the number of her mobile phone and a password. To generate a qualified 
electronic signature a temporary one-time password (TAN) will be sent via sms to the mobile 
number. This TAN has then to be entered in the A-Trust application and gives A-Trust access to 
the private key of the user. A-Trust then signs the hash value of the data with the private key and 
sends it to the SP.58  
10.1.3.1 National registration number/unique identifier 
For the identification of a citizen a unique identifier which is called sourcePIN (in German: 
‘Stammzahl’) is used. This sourcePIN is derived from the citizen’s registration number in the 
Central Register of Residents (CRR number, in German ‘ZMR-Zahl’) or the registration number 
in a supplementary register if the person is not registered in the residents register.59 This 
sourcePIN of natural persons may not be stored by any other entity. Other entities may only use 
sector specific PIN (ssPIN, in German ‘bPK’).60 The ssPIN is a number which is derived by 
hashing the sourcePIN together with an identifier of the respective entity. In the public sector is 
this identifier the specific sector number (‘Bereichskürzel’) while in the private sector it is the 
                                               
 
55
 Bundesgesetz über elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz - SigG), BGBl. I Nr. 190/1999 idF BGBl. I 
Nr. 59/2008. 
56
 Bundesgesetz über Regelungen zur Erleichterung des elektronischen Verkehrs mit öffentlichen Stellen 
(E-Government-Gesetz - E-GovG), BGBl.I Nr. 10/2004. 
57
See http://www.buergerkarte.at/hintergrund-informationen.html#jump7 which also states that the secure 
server fulfils the requirements of a secure signature creation device, since the access to the signature 
creation data on the secure server is restricted by the signature password.  
58
 http://www.buergerkarte.at/hintergrund-informationen.html#jump7  
59
 § 6 E-Government-Gesetz.   
60
 § 8 and §12 E-Government-Gesetz. 
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sourcePIN of the company. Consequently the ssPIN increases unlinkability across different 
entities/sectors, since from the ssPIN the sourcePIN can never be traced back.61  
 
Figure 2 Derivation of ssPIN 
The generation of the ssPIN in principle requires the cooperation from the data subject.62 Only in 
specific cases where the controller is required to establish the identity of the data subject 
because of statutory provisions it is allowed to generate an ssPIN without collaboration of the 
data subject. 63 In that case the generation may only be carried out by the sourcePIN Register 
Authority.64 
The Austrian E-Government Act provides certain restrictions to the use of ssPINs. It states for 
example that ssPINs shall not be stated in communication to data subjects or third parties and 
that matching of communication to the record of the controller should be done by other means 
such as reference numbers.65 Furthermore the sourcePIN may not be made available to the 
                                               
 
61
 § 9 E-Government-Gesetz; §14 E-Government-Gesetz; A. Lehman et al., “Survey and Analysis of 
Existing eID and Credential Systems”, FutureID Deliverable 32.1, 16.04.2013, p. 20.  
62
 § 15 (1) E-Government-Gesetz (and § 12 (2) E-Government-Gesetz). 
63
 § 15 (1) E-Government-Gesetz (and § 12 (2) E-Government-Gesetz). 
64
 § 15 (1) E-Government-Gesetz (and § 12 (2) E-Government-Gesetz). 
65
 § 11 E-Government-Gesetz. 
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controller in the private sector.66 Therefore, the computation from the source PIN for the 
generation of an ssPIN may not be carried out by a controller from the private sector.67  
The sourcePIN is derived and protected by the sourcePIN Register Authority 
(Stammzahlenregisterbehörde). The sourcePIN Register authority is introduced by §7 E-GovG 
for the Austrian Data Protection Commission (Datenschutzkommission). The Data Protection 
Commission has changed on 1 January 2014 into a Data Protection Authority which is more 
independent than the former Commission.68 The tasks of the sourcePIN Register Authority are 
the assignment of the sourcePIN and ssPINs69, keeping the supplementary register70 and the 
issuance of a substitute sourcePIN71. They are responsible for the definition and publication of 
the mathematical procedures for generating the sourcePIN, substitute sourcePIN and ssPIN,72 
and can include mandates on the card.73   
Identity link 
The Identity link (‘Personenbindung’) is the basis for the identification. It connects the person to 
the public key of the qualified certificate on the card. Issuing/verifying a signature by this 
qualified certificate is then used for authentication.  
During the issuance of the Citizen Card the sourcePIN Register Authority 
(‘Stammzahlenregisterbehörde’) creates an Identity link. The identity link is a data structure 
containing the sourcePIN, the citizen’s name and date of birth and the data that links the identity 
link to the qualified certificate stored on the token, which is signed with the signature of the 
sourcePIN Register Authority.74 The signature of the sourcePIN Register Authority confirms that 
the natural person, identified in the Citizen Card as the holder, has been assigned a particular 
sourcePIN for the purpose of unique identification.75 
                                               
 
66
 § 15 (2) E-Government-Gesetz, Electronic verification of the accuracy of the identity link used by the 
data subject is however possible by submitting a request for access to the Central Residents Registry 
under Paragraph 16(1) of the Meldegesetz 1991. 
67
 § 12 (1) 4 E-Government-Gesetz 
68
 see DSG Novelle, BGBl. I  83/2013; 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/BgblAuth/BGBLA_2013_I_83/BGBLA_2013_I_83.pdf.  
69
 § 10 Abs. 2 E-Government-Gesetz.  
70
 § 6 Abs. 4 E-Government-Gesetz. 
71
 § 6 Abs. 5 E-Government-Gesetz.  
72
 § 6 Abs. 6 and § 9 Abs. 3 E-Government-Gesetz. 
73
 § 5 E-Government-Gesetz.  
74
 H. Graux e.a., IDABC study: eID Interoperability for PEGS: Update of Country profiles study, Austrian 
country profile, July 2009 p. 10.; W. Kotschy, “Die Bürgerkarte in Österreich – Identity management im E-
Government“,DuD 30 (2006) 4, p. 203.   
75
 §4 (2) E-Government-Gesetz. 
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The Identity link and in particular the sourcePIN are specially protected and can only be read by 
an application that identifies itself as an Austrian administration office. For private applications 
the Middleware (Mocca) will mask the sourcePIN and replace it by a ssPIN that is only relevant 
for the concerned application.76 
10.1.3.2 Certificates 
There are two certificates on the card: one certificate used to encrypt data and for normal 
electronic signatures77 and one qualified signature certificate.78 Only the qualified certificate is 
needed for the Citizen Card function.79 The qualified signature certificate consists of the public 
key, name of the person, optional e-mail address or birthdate in case of minors, and the validity 
date. While the Citizen Card on a smartcard has two certificates, the handy signature, which is a 
server-based Citizen Card, uses only the qualified signature certificate.80  
10.1.3.3 Origin of the information 
The information in the identity link is provided by/checked against the Central Register of 
Residents (Zentrales Melderegister), which is a register of residents of Austria.81 For unique 
identification every data set gets a number assigned which contains no information about the 
person (CRR number).82 The sourcePIN is derived from that person’s CRR number.83 For 
foreigners or expatriates that are not registered in the central register a supplementary Register 
for Natural Persons (Ergänzungsregister für natürliche Personen) exists. For legal persons the 
Commercial Register (Firmenbuch), Central Register of Associations (Zentrales Vereinsregister) 
and a Supplementary Register of Other Data Subjects (Ergänzungsregister für sonstige 
Betroffene) are used.   
The central register is a public register where information on the main address/place of 
residence of a person can be requested if the requester provides name, last name and at least 
one other attribute such as birthdate or ssPIN, by which the requested person can be 
unambiguously identified from the whole data set.84   
 
                                               
 
76
 http://wiki.a-trust.at/wiki/Default.aspx?site=B%C3%BCrgerkarte 
77
 http://wiki.a-trust.at/wiki/Default.aspx?site=Zertifikat 
78
 http://wiki.a-trust.at/wiki/Default.aspx?site=B%C3%BCrgerkarte 
79
 H. Graux e.a., IDABC study: eID Interoperability for PEGS: Update of Country profiles study, Austrian 
country profile, July 2009, p. 17.  
80
 http://wiki.a-trust.at/wiki/Default.aspx?site=Zertifikat 
81
 §16 Meldegesetz-Durchführungsverordnung (Verordnung des Bundesministers für Inneres über die 
Durchführung des Meldegesetzes (MeldeV), BGBl. II Nr. 66/2002). 
82
 §16(4) of the Meldegesetz 1991, BGBl. No 9/1992. 
83
 §16(1) of the Meldegesetz 1991, BGBl. No 9/1992. 
84
 § 16 (1) MeldG.  
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10.1.3.1 Which information will be transferred? 
The aforementioned qualified electronic signing certificate is used in the authentication process. 
The data subject signs a statement “I, <name> <date of birth> authenticate to application 
<service provider> on <date> <time>”. Name and birthdate are provided by the identity link.85 
Therefore the full name and date of birth are always transferred to the service provider, together 
with the signature, the signing certificate and the sourcePIN (in case of a public service) or the 
ssPIN (in case of a private sector service provider). Moreover, other attributes which are stored 
in the card/middleware/appropriate online services can be used, such as attributes that certify 
being a health-service provider or electronic mandates.
86
 
 
 Possible legal restrictions 10.1.4
For use in the private sector may the ssPIN for the specific controller only be derived using the 
Citizen Card, wherein the sourcePIN of the private sector data controller replaces the sector 
code.87 This means the controller must have set up a technical environment in which the Citizen 
Card can be used and in which the controller´s sourcePIN is made available as the sector code 
for generation of the ssPIN. This means in practice that the ssPIN will be generated by the 
mocca middleware. Controllers in the private sector may store and use only such ssPINs that 
have been generated using their own sourcePIN as sector code.88 The difficulty for cross-border 
use will be that in order to use the Austrian system foreign SPs and citizens need in principle a 
sourcePIN. Citizens can register in the Supplementary Register for Natural Persons 
(Ergänzungsregister für natürliche Personen (ERnP)) if they want an Austrian Citizen Card. 
Foreign SPs, as legal persons that do not need to register in the Commercial Register or Central 
Register of Associations can register in the Supplementary Register of Other Data Subjects 
(Ergänzungsregister sonstiger Betroffener (ERsB)). Therefore foreign SPs that aim to accept 
directly the Austrian Citizen Card could register in the Supplementary Register of Other Data 
Subjects. In case the FutureID Broker is a separate legal person, it could obtain its own 
sourcePIN, and generate with this the ssPIN. However, if the FutureID Broker is located in 
Austria, this ssPIN can in principle not be sent to the SPs since it is not allowed to disclose 
ssPINs. If the FutureID Broker is not located in Austria, it might be possible to disclose the 
ssPIN, since the Austrian data protection legislation would not apply in this case.  
 
                                               
 
85
 H. Graux e.a., IDABC study: eID Interoperability for PEGS: Update of Country profiles study, Austrian 
country profile, July 2009, p. 14.  
86
 A. Lehman et al., “Survey and Analysis of Existing eID and Credential Systems”, FutureID Deliverable 
32.1, 16.04.2013, p. 21; cf. Stork D5.1.  
87
 § 14 (1) E-Government-Gesetz. 
88
 § 14 (2) E-Government-Gesetz. 
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 Country report Belgium 10.2
 eID Credentials 10.2.1
The Belgian government issues three different types of eID credentials.89 The first one is a 
username password combination the user can choose herself and the second one the federal 
token. The federal token is a paper card in the size of a bankcard with 24 personal 6 letter 
codes. On the card is the name and the date of request printed, but not the personal 
identification number or a date of validity.90 The third type of eID credential that the Belgian 
government issues is the electronic identity card. The electronic identity card (eID card) comes 
in three variations. The first one is the citizen eID, which is the ID card for every citizen of 
Belgium. The second and third one are the Kids-ID and the Foreigners eID, which are ID cards 
for persons who cannot obtain the normal Belgian citizen ID since they are either too young or 
don’t have the Belgian nationality. The remainder of this country report will focus on the eID 
card, since this is considered to be the main solution for e-government in Belgium and is 
expected to gradually replace the other two solutions91. In 2012 had 50% of the Belgian citizens 
(European: 43%) via internet contact with the administration. The main use of the eID was the 
tax declaration function, where in 2012 almost 65% of the total annual tax declarations have 
been done electronically.92  
There is no well-known and widely used cross-sectoral private eID solution in Belgium. The 
government proposes to use the governmental eID for the private sector, but has an indecisive 
stance in its approach of it.93 
 
 Legislation 10.2.2
The two main legal acts with regard to the Belgian eID are the act of 8 august 1983 (Wet tot 
regeling van een Rijksregister van de natuurlijke personen) (hereafter WetRR) and the act of 19 
July 1991 (Wet betreffende [de bevolkingsregisters, de identiteitskaarten, de 
vreemdelingenkaarten en de verblijfsdocumenten] en tot wijziging van de wet van 8 augustus 
                                               
 
89
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 117.  
90
 http://www.vlaanderen.be/nl/overheid/token-en-elektronische-identiteitskaart-eid (accessed 19.6.2014).  
91
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security: Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 119.  
92
 http://economie.fgov.be/nl/consument/Internet/ICT_in_cijfers/ 
93
 See J. Dumortier, “eID en de paradoks van het Rijksregisternummer”, Trends Business ICT, March 
2005. Source: 
https://www.law.kuleuven.be/apps/icri/db_publications/655Column_BusinessICT_06_eID.pdf (accessed 
20.6.2014).  
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1983 tot regeling van een Rijksregister van de natuurlijke personen) (hereafter WetID), which 
have been updated by later legal acts94 and Royal Decrees (e.g. KB 25.3.2003, KB 5.6.200495).  
The first mentioned legal act, WetRR, defines the specifics of a national register (rijksregister), 
the second legal act, WetID, adjusts/updates WetRR and defines the specifics of the national 
citizen registration, ID cards, foreigner cards and residence permits.  
 
 eID card 10.2.3
The Belgian eID card has four different functionalities. The first functionality is the classic non-
electronic visual identification and verification on the basis of the printed information and picture 
on the ID card.96 The second function is the digital identification, which uses the identity 
information contained in the chip, which can be read electronically and with which the identity of 
the cardholder can be established.97 The third one is the creation of authentication signatures 
which allow the cardholder to prove her identity online and the fourth one is the creation of non-
repudiation signatures which enable the cardholder to generate legally binding signatures.98  
Starting from 2014 the eID card replaces the health card (SIS card). While on the SIS card the 
information about the health insurance was stored, now the eID card will function as 
authentication credential from which the social insurance identification number, which is normally 
the national identification number, can be read electronically. The information on the insurance 
                                               
 
94
 e.g. Wet van 25.3.2003, wet tot wijziging van 8 augustus 1983 tot regeling van een Rijksregister van de 
natuurlijke personen en van de wet van 19 juli 1991 betreffende de bevolkingsregisters en de 
identiteitskaarten en tot wijziging van de wet van 8 augustus 1983 tot regeling van een Rijksregister van 
de natuurlijke personen; Wet van 15 mei 2007 waarbij de bevoegdheid om toegang te verlenen tot de 
informatiegegevens van het wachtregister en van het register van de identiteitskaarten toevertrouwd wordt 
aan het sectoraal comité van het Rijksregister. 
95
 5.6.2004, Koninklijk besluit tot vaststelling van het stelsel van de rechten tot inzage en verbering van de 
gegevens die op elektronische wijze opgeslagen zijn op de identiteitskaart en van de informatiegegevens 
die zijn opgenomen in de bevolkingsregisters of in het Rijksregister van de natuurlijke personen.  
96
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 119.  
97
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 119.  
98
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 119.  
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status will not be on the card but will be in a database which is accessible via the MyCareNet-
network, where it is available with the number and the authentication of the medical staff.99  
The information on the card is defined by art. 6 §2 WetID. It states that the information must be 
visible on the card and electronically readable on the chip and must contain the following:  
o Name 
o Given names 
o Nationality 
o Place and date of birth 
o Gender 
o Issuing municipality 
o Start- and expiration date of the card 
o Name and number of the card 
o National registration number 
In addition is a photo printed on the card and separately saved on the chip in the Photo file in 
JPEG format.100  
Only electronically readable is: 
o The identity and signature keys 
o The identity and signature certificates 
o The certification service provider 
o Information necessary for the authentication of the card and the security of the 
electronic readable information on the card and for the use of the qualified 
certificates 
o Other information provided by laws 
o Address file:  
 Last known official address (can be changed over the lifetime of the 
card) 
 Signed by the national register together with the identity file 
                                               
 
99
https://www.ksz.fgov.be/binaries/documentation/nl/documentation/pers/vaarwel_sis_kaart_v3.pdf. A 
similar approach is used for transportation tickets, which can be bought online and the information will be 
stored in a database. The eID is then used during ticket inspection to link the traveller to the ticket in the 
data base. See: 
http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/beraadslaging_RR_029_2009
_0.pdf  
100
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 123.  
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When the citizen receives the letter that the eID is ready to be collected at the citizens service 
department, this letter includes a PIN and a personal 6 digit PUK code. The PUK code is needed 
to activate the eID card the first time when collecting it. The PIN is necessary for the eSignature 
function and the citizen can change it at the citizens service department to a number it likes, 
whereby a maximum of 12 digits is possible.101  
10.2.3.1 Certificates 
The card’s chip contains five X.509v3 certificates.102 These certificates are a self-signed Belgian 
Root CA certificate, a certificate of the Citizen or Foreigner’s CA, a certificate of the national 
register, which is used when verifying the signatures on the identity and address files, and two 
certificates which are tied to the cardholder. These two certificates are the authentication 
certificate which enables the cardholder to authenticate herself online and the non-repudiation 
certificate which can be used to produce qualified electronic signatures. All of the certificates 
specify in accordance with the X.509v3 specification its issuer, the subject, a certificate serial 
number, the public key that has been certified together with its permitted use, its validity period 
and further information.103 Only the authentication and non-repudiation certificate contain an 
additional field (SerialNumber), where the national number of the cardholder is included. 104  
The certificates are at issuance by default activated. The civil servant will revoke them only in 
case the cardholder expresses at the moment of issuance the preference to have the certificates 
not activated.105 
10.2.3.2 National Identification number (Rijksregisternummer) 
During the first registration in the national register every person is assigned a personal 
identification number.106 For Belgians this is usually at birth, foreigners normally get the number 
assigned when they are registered in the foreigner - or waiting register.  
                                               
 
101
 http://eid.belgium.be/en/using_your_eid/what_do_you_need/eid_en_pin-code/ last checked on 
19.6.2014.  
102
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 124.  
103
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 125.  
104
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 125.  
105
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p 131, art. 6 § 2 WetID.  
106
 Art. 2 WetRR. 
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This number consists of 11 digits, whereby the first 6 are the birthday of the citizen in the order 
of year, month and day.107 The following three digits identify people which are born on the same 
day with a sequence number, starting with 001 for the first man born on that day and 002 for the 
first woman (men get an odd number, females an even number).108 Finally the last two digits 
form a check sum.109 The identification number can be considered a “meaningful” identifier, 
because two of the three components of this number refer to personal attributes of the citizen.110 
Furthermore, the number is used by almost every governmental agency, regardless of context or 
sector.111 Foreigners who are not registered in one of the population registers but have a right to 
social security get a BIS number, which is almost the same as the national registration number, 
but the month (3rd and 4th digit) is increased with 40 if the gender is known at the issuance, and 
with 20 if the gender is unknown.  
10.2.3.3 Where does the information come from? 
The Belgian system relies on the ‘authentic source principle’.112 The information on the eID card 
mainly comes from the national register. The national register started as an internal tool in 1968 
and got later in 1983 an official legal basis with the WetRR.113 
The national register is a system of information processing which is responsible for the intake, 
storage and communication of information concerning the identification of natural persons.114 
The information in the register comes from the population register and foreigner register of the 
Belgian municipalities, the register of persons held by the diplomatic missions and consulates 
abroad, and the waiting register (data about candidate refugees115).116 The authorities who keep 
the register are supposed to provide the information to the national register to keep it up to 
                                               
 
107
 Art. 1 and 2, 3 APRIL 1984. - Koninklijk besluit betreffende de uitoefening van het recht op toegang en 
verbetering door de personen ingeschreven in het Rijksregister van de natuurlijke personen (KB 3.4.1984) 
108
 Art. 3 KB 3.4.1984, the numbering starts again for everyone born in or after 2000.    
109
 Art. 4 KB 3.4.1984.  
110
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 133.  
111
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 126.  
112
 R. Leenes, B. Priem, C. van de Wiel, K. Owczynik, “Report on legal interoperability”, STORK 
Deliverable 2.2, p. 58.  
113
 J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints, B. van Alsenoy, “Conceptual Framework for Identity Management in 
eGovernment”, FIDIS Deliverable 16.1, 18.11.2008, p. 99 and 
http://www.ibz.rrn.fgov.be/index.php?id=2461&L=1 (20.6.2014).  
114
 Art. 1 WetRR.  
115
 J.C. Buitelaar, M. Meints, B. van Alsenoy, “Conceptual Framework for Identity Management in 
eGovernment”, FIDIS Deliverable 16.1, 18.11.2008, p. 99.  
116
 Art.2 WetRR.  
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date.117 Within the Belgian DPA exists a specific committee of the national register (sectorial 
comité van het Rijksregister) which is in charge of the issuance of authorisation.118 It has been 
introduced by art. 15 WetRR. This committee can provide authorisations to access information in 
the national register119 and to use the national register number120.  
10.2.3.4 Which information is transferred during authentication? 
There are two different ways to use the card for electronic identification/authentication. One uses 
the cryptographic functionality of the card, the other one uses non-cryptographic functionality.  
 
For the non-crypto functionality of the card the information can be transferred in two ways. One 
is in case of local access to the card, e.g. if a bank during identification to open a bank account 
reads the card out electronically. In this case there is no access control and it is possible to read 
all the information on the chip.121 The Belgian privacy act restricts which information can be used 
or kept, but there is no technical control. The other case is remote access (e.g. in the context of 
an online transaction), where the physical presence of the eID card, a card reader and specific 
software on the cardholder’s computer is required.122 In this case the software does not 
automatically transmit the information, instead transmission requires an additional action by the 
computer system used by the cardholder.123  
The cryptographic functionality permits the user to produce digital signatures for authentication 
and qualified electronic signatures.124 The authentication and non-repudiation certificate 
necessary for this specify its issuer, the subject, a certificate serial number, the public key that 
has been certified together with its permitted use and its validity period, but most importantly 
                                               
 
117
 Art. 4 WetRR.  
118
 Art. 15 WetRR.  
119
 Art. 5 jo. Art. 16 WetRR.  
120
 Art. 8 jo. Art. 16 WetRR.  
121
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 133.  
122
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011er, p. 123.  
123
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 123.   
124
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 123.  
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they include the national number of the cardholder which therefore is propagated every time the 
certificates are used.125  
One provision in the WetID is unclear and could therefore possibly form a hurdle. Art. 6 §4 
WetID provides that every automated control of the card by optical or other reading procedures 
must be based on a royal decree after receiving advice of the sectorial comity of the national 
register. It is unclear how far this goes and until now no royal decree has been issued, which 
several times has been criticized by the Belgian DPA.126   
 
 
 Possible legal restrictions 10.2.4
The main legal restriction private service providers face when using the Belgian eID is the use of 
the national identity number. Belgium uses a central national number, which is also on the eID 
card and in the certificates. Because of data protection considerations the Belgian government 
regulated the use of the national number and requires a prior authorisation by the sectorial 
committee of the national register.127 In principle the authorisation can only be given to entities 
mentioned in art. 5 WetRR, which excludes private entities which have no tasks in the public 
interest. The king can give royal decrees which define cases for which no authorisation is 
required.128 In case an authorisation has been given, the entity must follow specific requirements 
set by art. 10 WetRR, which requires that the entity assigns an adviser in information security 
and protection.  
Because the identity number is included in the certificate, the identity number is propagated to 
entities unauthorized to use it.129 The DPA affirmed in one of its opinions that entities, who don’t 
have an authorisation or can use a Kings decree exempting their service, may not process the 
national number.130 They have to technically ensure that certificates in such cases are only used 
                                               
 
125
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 133.  
126
 
http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/aanbeveling_03_2011_0.pdf. 
See also http://www.privacycommission.be/nl/mag-ik-een-kaartlezersysteem-installeren-om-de-
elektronische-identiteitskaart-te-lezen-en-onder. 
127
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 134.  
128
 Art. 8 WetRR.  
129
 D. De Cock, B. Van Alsenoy, B. Preneel, J. Dumortier, “The Belgian eID Approach”, in W. Fumy, M. 
Paeschke (ed.): ‘Handbook of eID Security : Concepts, Practical Experiences, Technologies’, Publicis, 
Erlangen, 2011, p. 134.  
130
 ADVIES Nr 13 / 2006 van 24 mei 2006, p. 13 rndnr. 58, 
http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_13_2006_0.pdf.  
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for validation and that no further processing occurs.131 A lot of private service providers solve this 
problem by hashing the identity number.132 However, hashing the identity number is still 
considered ‘use of the identity number’ and is only allowed with an authorisation.133 Since it is 
not sure whether a FutureID Broker will be able to get such an authorisation a possible solution 
might be to connect to a credential transformer that obtained an authorisation to process the 
unique identification number (this could be for example a service of FEDICT, or a PEPS of 
STORK). This service could hash the number after which it would be possible to legally use the 
hashed number.  
In principle certificates can form a restriction since Member States may determine for which 
purpose a particular certificate may be used.134 For the Belgian eID the certification policy 
describes no restrictions on cross-border use, the CPS Citizen CA states only a liability limitation 
of (non-qualified) certificates to 2500 € per transaction.135 
 
 Country report Germany 10.3
 
 eID Credentials: 10.3.1
The German government has introduced three different types of electronic credentials by now: 
 The electronic identity card (“elektronischer Personalausweis”) has been rolled out since 
1 November 2010 to supersede the paper-based identity card issued before. 
 An X.509 certificate is being used by citizens and organisations for their tax declaration 
(“ELSTER – Elektronische Steuererklärung”) since 2006. 
 The Health Card (“elektronische Gesundheitskarte”) has been tested since 2006 and 
can meanwhile be used by patients who are member of a statutory health insurance.136 
                                               
 
131
 ADVIES Nr 13 / 2006 van 24 mei 2006, p. 13 rndnr. 58, 
http://www.privacycommission.be/sites/privacycommission/files/documents/advies_13_2006_0.pdf. 
132
 B. De Decker, V. Naessens, J. Lapon, P. Verhaeghe, “Kritische beoordeling van het gebruik van de 
Belgische eID kaart”, May 2008, p.2. In this report is stated that hashing is not the best way to ensure that 
the number cannot be linked anymore to the person.  
133
 See also the decision of the court in Bruxelles (9
e 
ch) of 9 May 2012, R.G. no 2011/AR/1038. 
134
 R. Leenes, B. Priem, C. van de Wiel, K. Owczynik, “Report on legal interoperability”, STORK 
Deliverable 2.2, p. 40. 
135
 http://repository.eid.belgium.be/index.php?lang=nl . 
136 The eHealth program in Germany has started 1995 with “Krankenversicherungskarte” (KVK), a 
memory card with only some data from the Insurance organization and the card holder; this program is 
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All these credentials introduced by the government have to adhere to the principle that there 
must not be a unique, universal, lifelong personal identifier for a person: 
In 1969, the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared in the 
“Mikrozensusentscheidung“ (BVerfGE 27, 1) that personal profiles built without giving the person 
concerned the possibility to verify the correctness and usage are illegal. This judgement was 
confirmed in the “Volkszählungsurteil” of 1983 (BVerfGE 65, 1). Since unique and universal 
personal identifiers (“Personenkennzeichen”, “PKZ”) valid for the entire lifetime can be used to 
build large person profiles, they must not be introduced and used in Germany. In an online use 
context, this is especially important with respect to privacy. A unique identifier would allow to 
track the user's online activities and create usage patterns. This is avoided by employing sector 
specific identifiers, often valid only for a certain timeframe. 
When the unique tax ID (“Steuer-Identifikationsnummer”) that is issued at birth was introduced in 
October 2008, it was criticised because this ID may function as a universal personal identifier. At 
least there are legal barriers to use that ID in a sector-spanning way. 
In the following we will describe important aspects and features of the electronic identity card 
(eID card). 
 Legislation: 10.3.2
Two acts are important for the German eID card: the ‚Gesetz über Personalausweise und den 
elektronischen Identitätsnachweis (Personalausweisgesetz – PAuswG)‘ from 18.06.2009, last 
changes: 20.06.2015 states the duty to possess an ID card and regulates its provision and 
suspension. It further includes provisions on the electronic ID card and on data protection. The 
‘Verordnung über Personalausweise und den elektronischen Identitätsnachweis 
(Personalausweisverordnung – PAuswV)‘ from 01.11.2010, last change: 01.07.2015, further 
specifies the provisions on the (electronic) ID card. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
based on the KVK law (Gesetz zur Modernisierung der gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung (GKV-
Modernisierungsgesetz - GMG) G. v. 14.11.2003 BGBl. I S. 2190 (Nr. 55); zuletzt geändert durch Artikel 1 
G. v. 15.12.2004 BGBl. I S. 3445). The roll out of the 2
nd
 generation was started 10/2012; the 2
nd
 
Generation e-health card is named “elektronische Gesundheitskarte” (eGK). It is a controller card with 
much more information, such as electronic prescription, medical record, emergency data and many 
others; the eGK is also an electronic ID-token; this capture for example the photo printed of the card 
holder, by national law. Since 04/2013 round 70 million citizens have this card in the pocket; the online 
use cases would be start 07/2016. The national law on this is preparation for publication in 01/2016 
(Entwurf eines Gesetzes für sichere digitale Kommunikation und Anwendungen im Gesundheitswesen, 
Drucksache 18/5293 18. Wahlperiode 22.06.2015). 
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 eID card: 10.3.3
German identity cards issued after 31 October 2010 are ID-1 (credit card size) plastic cards with 
printed information (among others the name and a photo of the holder), an embedded RFID chip 
(an ISO 18000-3 and ISO 14443 compatible 13.56 MHz RFID chip supporting ISO 7816 
protocols), and, on the back side, a machine-readable zone. Apart from the access possibilities 
by law enforcement entities and specific other authorities (e.g. for the purpose of border control) 
to all of the data stored on the chip, there is the option to use the eID card for digital 
authentication. In this setting, the holder of the eID card can decide which attributes to disclose 
(attribute selection), and in addition the possibility of attribute aggregation is provided for the 
date of birth (i.e. revealing not the exact date, but only the information whether the holder’s age 
is in be given range (e.g. “over 18”) or not) and the place of residence (e.g. revealing only the 
administrative district or municipality instead of the city). Furthermore, the eID card holder can 
use it to sign documents electronically.  
10.3.3.1 Attributes on the eID card: 
Data that are stored on the German eID card could be printed on the front or rear side, part of 
the machine readable zone on the back, or stored in the RFID chip. This is summarized in Table 
1. 
Attribute Printed MRZ Chip Remark 
Name x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 2 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Name at birth x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
The name at 
birth is only 
printed in case it 
is different from 
the current 
surname. 
Given name(s) x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2)No. 2 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 3 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Doctorate x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 3 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
Only if 
applicable. 
Date of birth x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 4 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 6 
PAuswG) 
X 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Place of birth x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 4 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Photo x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 5 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Signature x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 6 
PAuswG) 
   
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 52 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
Height (in cm) x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 7 
PAuswG) 
   
Colour of eyes x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 8 
PAuswG) 
   
Address (postal 
code, town, street, 
street number) 
x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 9 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Nationality x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 10 
PAuswG) 
x (only if 
German 
nationality; “D”) 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 5 
PAuswG) 
x (only if 
German 
nationality; “D”) 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 2 
PAuswG) 
 
Document number 
(9 alphanumeric 
digits) 
x (front) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 11 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 4 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 2 
PAuswG) 
9 alphanumeric 
characters: 4 for 
the 
administrative 
body, 5 random 
characters. 
Religious name, 
artist name 
x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) No. 12 
PAuswG) 
 x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 1 
PAuswG) 
 
Issuing municipality x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) PAuswG) 
   
Date of issuing the 
eID card (begin of 
validity) 
x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) PAuswG) 
   
Expiration date of 
the validity 
x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 7 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 2 
PAuswG) 
 
Access number for 
the communication 
with an RFID reader 
x (rear) 
(Para. 5 (2) PAuswG) 
  6 digits. 
Information whether 
it is a provisional eID 
card 
 x 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 1 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 2 
PAuswG) 
 
Access number for 
RFID chip (6 digital 
digits) 
    
Check numbers  X 
(Para. 5 (4) S. 2 No. 8 
PAuswG) 
x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 2 
PAuswG) 
 
Optional: 
fingerprints 
  x 
(Para. 5 (5) No. 3 
PAuswG) 
 (Para. 5 (9) PauswG) 
Table 1: Overview of attributes on the German eID card 
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Note that the document number, check numbers and information on revocation must not contain 
information that may support identification of the holder of the eID (cf. para. 5 (8) PAuswG). 
Citizen can decide by national law to switch the eID function “on” or “off”; today more than 70% 
of the round 40 million issued cards have eID in the mode “off”.137 
 
10.3.3.2 National Identification number: 
As explained in 10.3.3.1., unique and universal personal identifiers are not allowed in Germany. 
Therefore, the eID card does not contain a unique national identification number. Instead, the 
eID card contains several identification numbers, in particular a unique document number that is 
built from an identifier (first 4 characters) of the issuing authority and a random number (5 
characters; numbers and letters). However, this unique document number will not be transferred 
in the process of authentication. The document number changes when the citizen receives a 
new ID card. 
 
10.3.3.3 Where does the information come from? 
According to para. 9 (3) PAuswG the citizen has to provide the necessary data and 
accompanying evidence when applying for an eID card (e.g. previous ID cards, birth certificate, 
civil status certificate). Only in case of doubt concerning the identity of the applicant, the issuing 
authority has to conduct the necessary means according to para. 9 (4) PAuswG to determine the 
person’s identity.  
 
10.3.3.4 Which information will be transferred? 
Para. 18 (4) PAuswG provides that the information will only be transferred if the service provider 
possesses a valid authorisation certificate, provides it to the eID card holder and the holder 
enters his PIN. The certificate includes the name, address and e-mail address of the service 
provider, the categories of the data to be transferred, the purpose of the processing, information 
on the competent supervisory authority and the last day of the validity of the certificate. The eID 
card holder needs to receive this information before entering the PIN. 
The following table shows the specific attributes and whether they are always or potentially 
transferred: 
 
                                               
 
137
 see ‘eGovernment Monitor 2015’, p. 20, available at:  http://www.egovernment-monitor.de/die-
studie/2015.html .  
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Attribute Always 
transferred 
Potentially 
transferred 
Remark 
Identifier that can be checked 
against a list of revoked or 
suspended eID cards 
(“Sperrmerkmal”) 
x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 1 
PauswG) 
 Purpose: check of validity. 
This identifier is calculated from 
the revocation password, the 
family name, the given names 
and the date of birth of the eID 
holder (Para. 2 (6a) PAuswG)   
Information whether the eID card 
is valid 
x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 1 
PauswG) 
 Purpose: check of validity. 
Name  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 1 PauswG) 
 
Name at birth  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 1a PauswG) 
 
Given name(s)  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 2 PauswG) 
 
Doctorate  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 3 PauswG) 
 
Date of birth  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 4 PauswG) 
See below: Aggregated 
information can be calculated 
and transferred instead of the 
exact attribute value. 
Place of birth  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 5 PauswG) 
 
Address (postal code, town, street, 
street number) 
 x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 6 PauswG) 
See below: Aggregated 
information can be calculated 
and transferred instead of the 
exact attribute value. 
Document type  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 7 PauswG) 
 Note: The transfer might be 
necessary in order to distinguish 
the eID from other documents 
which allow an electronic proof 
of identity (e.g. residence 
permit) in the future.138 
Identifier that is calculated in the  x The identifier refers to the 
                                               
 
138
Bundesverwaltungsamt – Vergabestelle für Berechtigungszertifikate: “Leitlinie für die Vergabe von 
Berechtigungen für Diensteanbieter nach § 21 Abs. 2 Personalausweisgesetz. Version 1.0”, p. 5. 
http://www.personalausweisportal.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Material-
Dienstleister/Leitlinie_VfB_Vergabe_Berechtigungszertifikate.pdf?__blob=publicationFile  
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chip with respect to the specific 
service provider and eID card 
(“dienste- und kartenspezifisches 
Kennzeichen”) 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 8 PauswG) 
combination of service provider 
and the eID card. It is not 
linkable across multiple service 
providers. 
Nationality: only if German 
nationality; “D” 
 x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 9 PauswG) 
 
Information whether the age is 
within a given range 
 x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 10 PauswG) 
Aggregated information. 
Information whether the place of 
residence matches a given location 
(e.g. city, region, ...) 
 x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 11 PauswG) 
Aggregated information. 
Religious name, artist name  x 
(Para. 18 (3) S. 2 
No. 12 PauswG) 
 
Table 2: Transfer of information for electronic authentication 
Authentication Certificate (“Berechtigungszertifikat”): 
For the transmission of information the relying party needs a special certificate. In order to obtain 
this certificate, the Relying Party has to apply to the ‘Vergabestelle für Berechtigungszertifikate’ 
(VfB) established at the “Bundesverwaltugsamt” as the competent office.139 In this process the 
purpose and the data asked for have to be described. Relying Parties are obliged to only ask for 
necessary data (e.g. not for the birth date when disclosing the property “over 18” is sufficient to 
serve the purpose). Para. 21 (2) PAuswG provides that the authorisation has to be granted if 
inter alia the proposed purpose is not unlawful, the purpose lies not in the transfer of data to third 
parties for economic reasons and there are no indications for a economic or unjustified 
processing of data. Here the business purpose is important, the Relying Party must have a 
legitimate business purpose which cannot be address trading.140 Para. 21 (2) 2a PAuswG which 
has been introduced by Art. 9 EVerwFG141 provides that a transfer to specific third parties in 
order to fulfil a business purpose is allowed, if this business purpose is not the transfer of data 
itself.142 If the Relying Party obtains the permission, it will receive the authorisation certificate 
from the respective certification authority (Berechtigungs CA). In the certificate is included which 
categories of data may be transferred. The eID card holder can restrict the transfer of these 
categories of data on an individual basis (para. 18 (5) PAuswG). 
                                               
 
139
The ‘Bundesverwaltungsamt’, see the announcement of 26.2.2010 by the Federal Ministry of Interior, 
Bundesanzeiger Nr 37, 9.3.2010, p. 952. 
140
BT-Drs 17/11473 (Gesetzentwurf) p.73; G. Hornung, A. Roßnagel, „An ID card for the Internet – the 
new German ID card with ‘electronic proof of identity’”, Computer Law & Security Review, Volume 26, 
Issue 2, 2010, p. 151-157, p.155. 
141
Gesetz zur Förderung der elektronischen Verwaltung sowie zur Änderung weiterer Vorschriften 
(EVerwFG), G. v. 25.07.2013 BGBl. I S. 2749 (Nr. 43), 2015 I 678; Geltung ab 01.08.2013. 
142
§ 21 (2) 2a PAuswG. 
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 56 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
The user also has the possibility to determine a pseudonym for the use of her eID card towards 
a SP. This has already been described in D32.1.143 
 
 Possible legal restrictions: 10.3.4
Certificate obligation: Para. 21 PAuswG 
In order to send the information the FutureID Broker would have to read out the information from 
the user’s eID first. This requires an authorisation certificate. Two options are possible, either the 
Service Provider (SP) has its own certificate, or the FutureID Broker has one (or several) 
certificates and transfers the data according to the order of the user. In the first case the 
certification authority will confirm that the Service Provider will not ask for more data than 
necessary. However, if the FutureID Broker is an individual entity, it is questionable whether it 
can obtain data from the user based on the certificate of the Service Provider. 
In the second case the FutureID Broker would receive a certificate and the Service Provider 
would not. A small hurdle for this might be that according to para. 21 (1) PAuswG the purpose of 
the business is significant for obtaining the special certificate. The data transfer should be 
necessary for the business purpose, and this business should, as para. 21 (2) provides, not be 
the transfer of data itself. It is considered that this provision does exclude among others possible 
Identity Providers, who make verified data from the German eID card available to an arbitrary 
amount of third persons.144 However, according to the guidelines to certification published by the 
certification authority (“Vergabestelle für Berechtigungszertifikate”) 145 several use cases in which 
the processing of personal data is to be considered as “necessary” for the described purpose 
(according to para. 21 (2) Nr. 3 PAuswG) were developed. From the existence of those 
examples one can conclude that not only the processing is “necessary” in these cases, but also 
that these use cases describe legal business models, resp. “purposes”. If the use cases 
(purposes) of processing were not legitimate one would not come to the next step, namely to 
check the necessity of the processing. 
In this respect, use case 6 describes a business model quite similar to the FutureID Broker 
Service. Use case 6 is described as “ID Safe”: For the purpose of further electronic identity 
                                               
 
143
 
http://futureid.eu/data/deliverables/year1/Public/FutureID_D32.1_WP32_v1.0_Survey%20of%20existing%
20eID%20and%20credential%20systems.pdf 
144
 Bundestagsdrucksache 17/11473, p.73, with reference to Bundestagsdrucksache 16/10489, p.43.  
145
Bundesverwaltungsamt – Vergabestelle für Berechtigungszertifikate: “Leitlinie für die Vergabe von 
Berechtigungen für Diensteanbieter nach § 21 Abs. 2 Personalausweisgesetz. Version 1.0”, p. 12. 
http://www.personalausweisportal.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Material-
Dienstleister/Leitlinie_VfB_Vergabe_Berechtigungszertifikate.pdf?__blob=publicationFile  
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management Service Providers (in this context: the FutureID Broker Service) can offer an “ID 
Safe” to the eID holders. The eID holder can store her verified personal data via electronic 
identity proof at the Broker Service and transmit the data as verified by the Broker Service to 
third parties (i.e.: one certain third party at a time) on a self-determined and informed basis. The 
eID holder must actively give consent for every single transmission of data to a third party 
(organisational/temporal break between electronic identity proof and user-controlled 
transmission). The consent to transmission normally must comply with para. 13 
Telemediengesetz (TMG).146 Para 13 TMG states the duties of a Telemedia Service Provider and 
mainly assures their compliance with Directive 95/46/EC with respect to user rights. 
The significant difference to e.g. address traders is that the FutureID Broker Service will not 
provide an arbitrary amount of third parties with the user’s personal data but will only process 
the user’s personal data when and to the extent to which the user triggers this processing (in the 
individual case). In this case the data minimisation might become a duty of FutureID. The 
FutureID Broker should ensure that the Service Provider neither asks for, nor receives more data 
than necessary for its business purpose, since otherwise the data minimisation function of the 
German eID could be undermined.   
 
 
 Country report Netherlands147 10.4
 eID credentials 10.4.1
In the Netherlands the State provides formal identities and the municipalities issue them. The 
‘Wet identificatieplicht 2005 (Identification Act 2005) lists three official ID documents in the 
Netherlands: identity card, passport and driver’s license. The Basic Registry Persons 
(Basisregistratie personen – BPR) is the source of information for providing official ID 
documents. The Basic Registry Persons contains name(s), last name, date, place and country of 
birth, address, gender, marital status, nationality and possibly right of residence, citizen service 
number (BSN), and information concerning parents, partner and children, travel documents, right 
to vote, and the organizations to which your personal data are being transferred.148 
                                               
 
146 "Telemediengesetz vom 26. Februar 2007 (BGBl. I S. 179), das zuletzt durch Artikel 2 Absatz 16 des 
Gesetzes vom 1. April 2015 (BGBl. I S. 434) geändert worden ist"  (TMG); (German Federal Telemedia 
Act). 
147 This country report is an updated version of the 2009 STORK country report from STORK Deliverable 
2.2, updated and elaborated in agreement with Prof. Leenes, the author of the STORK country report.   
148
 www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/persoonsgegevens/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-is-de-gemeentelijke-
basisadministratie-gba.html 
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 58 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
The eGovernment services are offered at different levels of government – central, provincial and 
local/municipality – and by numerous entities responsible for administering governmental tasks. 
Examples include the IB-group responsible for student grants, the Dutch tax authority, the social 
insurance institute, and the Dutch unemployment service (UWV). Even though initiatives for an 
eNik, a Dutch eID card, were already undertaken as off 2004, so far the Netherlands has no 
such card, but does have a system in place for electronic identity management. However, as will 
also become obvious from the analysis, the current Dutch system, as it is, cannot be integrated 
in FutureID.  
10.4.1.1 DigiD, eRecognition and PKI-government 
In the Netherlands electronic identities are issued via a number of routes. Citizens can make use 
of DigiD, businesses can make use of eRecognition (eHerkenning) and PKI-government (PKI-
overheid) is for machine-to-machine communication only between government agencies. In 
addition, there are numerous organisation-specific solutions. 
DigiD 
The Dutch eID model for citizens is based on:  
• The existence of several authentic registries that contain personal data of the citizens 
(i.e. the Key Registries), and;149 
• A single unique ID number to be used between Dutch citizens and the government (the 
Citizen Service Number (Burger Service Nummer - BSN).    
• Two authentication levels inside a central authentication scheme called DigiD. 
The DigiD service was designed to comprise three assurance levels, however, so far the 
claimant can obtain only two different kinds of DigiD’s with first and second level assurance: 
‘DigiD basis’ and ‘DigiD middle’. ‘DigiD basis’ requires for authentication a username and 
password (base level authentication), for ‘DigiD middle’ the user needs username, password and 
a session SMS token to authenticate (medium level authentication). The third level, ‘DigiD high’, 
was supposed to be filled in by the Dutch electronic Identity Card, called ‘eNIK’, but so far the 
eNIK has not been realized. 
Electronic identities are provided for and governed by DigiD, the common authentication system 
for government institutions, which is run by ‘Logius’.150 Logius is a division of the Ministry of 
                                               
 
149
 The Netherlands has a very elaborate system of key registrations in part still under development, e.g. 
persons (BPR), income, vehicles, addresses and buildings. An overview is available at: http://www.e-
overheid.nl/onderwerpen/stelselinformatiepunt/stelselthemas/verbindingen/verbindingen-tussen-
basisregistraties 
150 Formerly known as GBO.overheid, see: https://www.logius.nl/ 
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Interior and Kingdom Relations. Logius not only issues eIDs in the Netherlands, it also functions 
as the Authentication Authority. Logius can only provide authentication for base level 
authentication and for medium level authentication. The applicants’ application is checked 
against data in the Basic Registry Persons (BPR) and the activation details are sent to the 
applicant's home address (according to the BPR). Because the mail can be intercepted, the 
assurance level of the DigiD is relatively low. Termination of a Digital Identity can be done by the 
identity provider (Logius) at all times. A claimant can, at all times, delete his or her DigiD at the 
DigiD website.151  
DigiD is part of a federated identity management scheme. Associated relying parties, typically 
public administrations such as municipalities, redirect users for authentication to the DigiD 
website. Upon completion of the authentication process, the claimant is redirected to the 
eGovernment service. The BSN is released to a relying party when username and password of 
the claimant (and at middle level the onetime transaction code) match. The BSN contains no 
information about the claimant. In the Dutch context the eID does not need to contain additional 
data because all relying parties eligible for using the DigiD can obtain additional data pertaining 
to the DigiD holder from the basic registries on the basis of the BSN. In this respect it is 
important to clarify that Logius and DigiD are the responsibility of the Dutch Ministry of Interior 
and Kingdom Relations while the responsibility for the basic Registries lies at the municipal 
college of mayor and alderman.  
DigiD is not governed by a specific Act as such, but is primarily governed by contracts (terms 
and conditions, ‘Gebruiksvoorwaarden DigiD’) to which both claimants and relying parties are 
bound on registration. The DigiD base level and medium level identities can only be used for 
services/parties that have a contractual relationship with Logius. This contractual relation is only 
accessible for institutions that are authorised to use the BSN. This rules out foreign relying 
parties (as well as private sector entities not allowed to use the BSN). The Citizen Service 
Number and the Data Protection Act, define the legal conditions for use of the BSN. In addition, 
several Royal Decrees are relevant. The authentication levels of the DigiD scheme are not laid 
down in formal regulation. However, DigiD can be considered an electronic Signature according 
to the 2003 Electronic Signature Act.152 
                                               
 
151
 https://www.digid.nl/ 
152 Wet van 8 mei 2003 tot aanpassing van Boek 3 en Boek 6 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, de 
Telecommunicatiewet en de Wet op de economische delicten inzake elektronische handtekeningen ter 
uitvoering van richtlijn nr. 1999/93/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van de Europese Unie 
van 13 december 1999 betreffende een gemeenschappelijk kader voor elektronische handtekeningen 
(PbEG L 13) (Wet elektronische handtekeningen), Stb. 2003, 199. There is also a Decree and a 
Regulation on electronic signatures in the Netherlands, specifying e.g. requirements for certification 
providers and certificates. 
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The Dutch DigiD-scheme initially did not incorporate mechanisms for citizens to mandate others 
to act on their behalf. However, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations created this functionality by initiating a joint program to establish 
a common authorisation and delegation facility (known in Dutch as ‘Gemeenschappelijke 
Machtigings- en Vertegenwoordigingsvoorziening’ - GMV). As of 2010 this functionality is 
operational, e.g. with the Dutch Tax Authority.   
Apart from DigiD, the government also recognizes commercial CA certificates for a number of 
eGovernment applications. These CA certificates are based on prior physical identification, i.e. 
the applicant must appear in person before the CA to receive his credentials. Currently, seven 
private CAs are recognized that comply with the required standards regarding qualified 
certificates defined in the Dutch eSignatures Act and which can be used for certain 
eGovernment transactions. As trusted third parties they can deliver PKI based digital certificates 
for the generation of secure electronic signatures in eGovernment applications.153  
eRecognition154 
May 2010 the eRecognition Trust Framework was launched for businesses so they could 
electronically arrange their affairs with government bodies. The eRecognition Trust framework is 
a public-private cooperation in which accredited private sector providers issue businesses and 
authorities with proven e-identity, authentication and authorisation solutions.155 Within 
eRecognition two domains are defined: a 'cooperative domain' and a 'competitive domain'. The 
cooperative domain is the minimal set of agreements for parties to cooperate in the areas of 
infrastructure, applications and business while the competitive domain is part of the market 
where market parties compete on the provision of services within the framework of the set of 
agreements established in de cooperative domain. 
The eRecognition framework consists of the following four roles: 
eRecognition broker. This role is completely dedicated to the public service. It is the interface 
through which the public service 'talks' with the eRecognition network. The public service asks 
the network for an identification (a Chamber of Commerce reference) through the broker. The 
online user is then redirected to his or her authentication service of choice. 
Mandate registry (also known as authorisation registry). This register stores all authorisations of 
a person on behalf of the business. The authorisations can only be created and maintained by 
                                               
 
153
 An overview of Dutch CSP’s that can deliver PKI based digital certificates is available at: 
https://www.logius.nl/ondersteuning/pkioverheid/aansluiten-als-csp/toegetreden-csps/ 
154
 The information in this section is retrieved from the brochures and factsheets on eRecognition available 
at: https://www.eherkenning.nl/eRecognition 
155
 https://www.eherkenning.nl/eRecognition 
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an authorised person of that particular business. In the case of small businesses, this is usually 
the owner. 
Authentication service. This role makes the authentication tokens available in the network in real 
time. 
Token provider. The issuers provide authentication tokens (texting, OTP, certificates, user 
name/password) to businesses and their users.156 
Multiple parties, ensuring competition and innovation, perform the above-described roles. 
Providers may assume one or more of these roles. Providers have to meet the regulations laid 
down in the eRecognition Trust Framework. Parties can only participate after approval by 
Logius. Logius is responsible for a.o. admission, adherence, legal, testing, development, and 
information security. Logius also checks if the accredited providers adhere to the mutual 
agreements within the Trust Framework and guards the quality and safety of the network. All 
tasks are commissioned to Logius by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The system is based on the use of one digital master key and for each business a single e-
Identity (EID) token that can be used for various government services. The Trust Framework is 
based on international and open standards, such as SAML, STORK and XACML.  
Based upon their registration, companies can buy tokens and then register their mandates with 
those providers that are authorised participants in the Trust Framework. The parties they want 
to conduct business with, the relying parties being government and other businesses, also have 
a choice of providers. These types of providers offer a broker service, which makes all 
authentication tokens available to the user. Authentication tokens are technology neutral and 
thus a wide variety of options is available for users (e.g., SMS, OTP, certificate, user 
name/password). eRecognition incorporates the assurance levels of STORK in combination with 
a registry of mandates. This entails that users have to be mandated by their organisation for the 
tasks they are allowed to perform. Within the eRecognition framework existing means of 
authentication or keys (e.g. cards, mobile phones, tokens, passwords) are connected to 
eService Providers. The user is registered in the Mandate register and, through the 
Authentication service, a reliable and fast verification of this user can be accomplished.  
The technical connection to an eRecognition broker is established turnkey via SAAS (Software 
as a Service). The standard interface, as described in the eRecognition Trust Framework, is 
based on the open standard SAML protocol and is used by each eRecognition broker. This 
allows government agencies to switch providers without having to invest in adapting their 
systems. 
                                               
 
156 Idem. 
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When a legal (or designated) representative of a business logs on to the website of a 
government organisation, he (or she) uses the eID token issued by the eID service provider of 
his (or her) choice. Behind the scenes, authentication and authorisation at the relevant 
assurance level are carried out according to the policies set by the eRecognition governance 
organisation: an accredited eRecognition broker has access to an authentication service and an 
authorisation register. The broker identifies the person who logs on and the company (s)he 
represents and checks his/ her authorisation for the case in point. After logging on successfully, 
the representative can submit his/ her application, and the government organisation can be sure 
it is genuine. 
During an eRecognition transaction, the relying party receives the Chamber of Commerce 
registration number of the business he/she is dealing with, as well as a pseudonym (for privacy 
reasons) of the person acting on behalf of that business. In the eRecognition Trust Framework 
no use is made of the BSN. The pseudonym is a random number that is assigned to a user 
when approaching a provider by logging in with eRecognition. The pseudonym changes each 
time one logs in with a different provider. This way there is no central place of registration of all 
different transactions.  
Public Key Infrastructure for the Dutch government 
PKIoverheid is the name for the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) of the Netherlands enabling 
trustworthy electronic communication within and with Dutch government. PKI functions with 
digital key pairs, consisting of a private and public key, based upon an existing certificate 
hierarchy. This national hierarchy consists of 1 root Certificate Authority (CA) and 2 domain CAs 
(sub-CAs) each having Certificate Service Providers (CSPs) below them, that can issue several 
types of certificates (e.g. authentication, encryption, non-repudiation, service (such as SSL)). 
The difference with a commercial PKI is that the Dutch Government is responsible for the root 
CA.157 Logius supports the Dutch Minister of Interior and Kingdom Relations with the 
management and control of the PKI-overheid system. The key pairs are associated with one or 
more certificates, attesting to the identity or to attributes of the certificate and key holder. 
Currently there are four commercial Certificate Providers of PKIoverheid-certificates: Digidentity, 
ESG, KPN and QuoVadis.158 A CSP can only join PKIoverheid if it can prove that it complies with 
ETSI TS 101 456, a European standard for qualified certificates and when it adheres to 
additional PKIoverheid requirements contained in the Programme of Requirements.  
Development of a new Dutch eID system 
                                               
 
157
 The root certificate is available from: https://www.logius.nl/ondersteuning/pkioverheid/stamcertificaat-
installeren/ 
158
 https://www.logius.nl/ondersteuning/pkioverheid/#c8599 
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In October 2014, the Dutch Court of Audit (Algemene rekenkamer) presented a report to the 
House of Representatives.159 The report acknowledges that the starting point of the key 
registries, the fact that data are gathered once while used in multiple contexts, is both its 
strength, but also a vulnerability. Errors in the basic registry spread fast with profound 
consequences for citizens. In this respect the main conclusion of the Court of Audit is that 
steering and control of the system has become difficult. This requires a renewed system of 
governance of the key registries and the data exchanges in the system. The current governance 
is not equipped for the ‘digital unitary state’ that has emerged. The need is expressed to focus 
on standardization, consistency in definitions, methods and work processes, which might need 
to be anchored in a specific act, which could also be an effective instrument for the allocation 
and enforcement of responsibilities within the system.160 
In view of the criticism, as well as the burden of having different eIDs for citizens and businesses 
and the lack of a high level electronic Dutch identity card, the Dutch eID-system is currently in 
the process of a redesign, a process to be completed in 2017. In the current Dutch eID-system 
electronic identities are issued via a number of routes: for citizens there is DigiD, businesses can 
make use of eRecognition and for machine-machine traffic with and between government 
agencies there is PKI-overheid. In addition, there are numerous organisation-specific solutions. 
At this moment, the electronic identities of citizens and businesses are strictly separated, which 
is not desirable, e.g. for one-man businesses and intermediaries. The goals of the redesign are 
to provide organisations with increased assurance about online identification, a smaller key 
chain for citizens and businesses, improved continuity and fall back, freedom of choice regarding 
eID-tokens and European interconnection. The existing systems (DigiD, eRecognition and PKI 
overheid) and their tools will be reused as much as possible (no disinvestment) and incorporated 
into the new system in a gradual migration process (interoperability through conformity of 
agreement system). It is foreseen that new eID-tools (such as possibly eRijbewijs 
(eDriverslicense), eNIK (the foreseen Dutch electronic identity card) and market devices/eBank 
devices) will link up with the new eID-system. 
In view of the design process, Dutch government has conducted an outlook study into the 
possibilities of a government-wide eID-system geared towards a more widespread availability of 
high-level electronic identification devices. The strategy is presented in a document drawn up by 
the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, under the title: “Dutch eID-system Strategic 
Outlook and proposal for follow-up”.161 The following is based upon this strategic outlook. 
                                               
 
159
 The report is available in Dutch at the website http://www.rekenkamer.nl/. The Dutch title of the report 
is: “Basisregistraties vanuit het perspectief van de burger, fraudebestrijding en governance.” 
160
 Currently the key registries fall under responsibility of 5 different Ministers. 
161
 The outlook study was conducted during the summer of 2012. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations, Dutch eID system Strategic Outlook and proposal for follow-up, available at: http://www.eid-
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 64 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
The most important outset for the new Dutch eID-system is to establish one eID agreement 
system that is used for both the citizen and business domain. Another important design criterion 
is to limit dependence of one specific electronic identification device by allowing and stimulating 
several devices to be available to provide access to different services. The Dutch government 
refers to this criterion as a multi-device strategy. Second, the Dutch eID-strategy sets out that: 
“separate (government) service providers must be ‘unburdened’, so that they are not directly 
dependent on the various eID service providers (identity suppliers) in terms of migration and 
connections and do not need to develop and manage their own tools”. Furthermore, Dutch 
government points to massive potential economic returns on investments and opportunities for 
innovation if a strategy is applied of equal practicability of public and private eID-devices. 
Another important criterion concerns Dutch citizens and businesses to be able to participate 
unhindered in the European (digital) internal market. 
Dutch government has system responsibility for the developed eID agreement system. This also 
means that the Dutch government must develop a coordinated policy with respect to digital 
identities and authorisations; actively maintain and manage the agreement system; supervise 
(parts of) the agreement system and the participants. 
The elaboration of the Dutch eID-strategy takes place at three levels and is described as follows 
in the strategic outlook:  
“1. The government’s strategic policy in the field of authentication and authorisation: This eID 
policy is the joint responsibility of the Ministries of the Interior & Kingdom Relations and 
Economic Affairs, Agriculture & Innovation. 
2. System agreements and specifications, based on the strategic policy. The specifications and 
agreements will be drawn up and managed by those implementing bodies concerned (both 
public and private) and drawn up in collaboration with all stakeholders, in a governance structure 
set up for this purpose. 
3. Specific eID tools: services for authenticating (smart) cards, certificates, tokens, etc., 
authorisation (authorisation registers) and electronic signatures, based on the system 
specifications and agreements. The respective implementing public and private parties are 
responsible for the development and management: they set their own roll-out strategy and can 
make their own choices regarding design and technology within the strategic policy and 
frameworks.” 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
stelsel.nl/fileadmin/eid/documenten/20130812_Strategic_Outlook_and_proposal_for_follow-
up_eID_Stelsel.pdf 
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Simply said, the assignment to Dutch government is to develop a standard eID system that is 
safe, easy to use, protects privacy, and does not cost any money. Dutch government has been 
in consultation with stakeholders a long time and privacy and security are acknowledged as 
important design principles within the development process. Information must be 
compartmentalized and only those data must be registered that are actually necessary to 
perform the desired transaction. The system must also be user-centric, meaning that the user 
remains in control over the use of his keys. Security is focused at the prevention of identity fraud, 
and how to integrate authorisations for law enforcement in conformity with the existing legal 
frameworks. On the one hand user friendliness is an important design requirement, however, 
this must be balanced with security.  
In addition to the strategic outlook, another important document regarding the redesign of the 
Dutch eID system has been published on 23 July 2014. The report ‘Privacy Impact Assessment 
(PIA) - Ontwerp op hoofdlijnen eID Stelsel NL’ (PIA – Design main outlines Dutch eID system’) 
provides a PIA based on a more recent, but not publicly available, version of a draft eID system 
design titled: “eID Afsprakenstelsel 0.7, October 2013”. 
The PIA report states that a lot of uncertainty still remains regarding the new design of the Dutch 
eID system. The document clearly states that the Netherlands is still in the phase of testing the 
functionalities and design form a technological and process-oriented perspective. It is stressed 
that the phase is testing, and not yet pilot projects. The process of POT’s (Proofs of Technology) 
and POC’s (Proofs of Concept) was at the time of writing of the PIA report still in its preparatory 
phase.  
 
Introduction Platform eID / Idensys162 
Most recent developments of the Dutch eID System:163 
The most recent development in the Dutch eID redesign process is the choice of Dutch 
government to implement a so-called eID platform, holding on to the desire to create one 
standard for authentication and authorisation for public and private services by 2017. Through 
this standard, organizations will obtain more certainty on the identity of the person they are 
dealing with, and will be able to offer more online services. On 11 September 2014, the 
Masterplan eID has been established by the Steering Group eID (Stuurgroep eID), in which the 
                                               
 
162
 Based on Vergaderstukken eID Platform december 2014: http://www.eid-
stelsel.nl/fileadmin/eid/documenten/eid-platform/Vergaderstukken_eID-platform_december_2014.pdf, 
Jaarplan 2015 van 20 februari: https://digitaleoverheid.pleio.nl/file/download/30962422 , en Jaarplan 2015 
van 24 maart 2015:file://studfiles.campus.uvt.nl/files/home/home04/u1238923/Jaarplan_eID-
programma__2015.pdf. 
163
 Period December 2014 – June 2015. 
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mission of the eID System has been formulated as follows: ‘the eID System makes it possible to 
optimally determine a person’s identity, so that people can trust on online services from the 
government and the industry.’ This mission has been translated into the following primary 
objective of the eID System: ‘the establishment of the eID System, which makes it possible to 
determine the identity and authority of citizens and companies with a degree of certainty that is 
sufficient for the relevant transaction service.’ 
In December 2014, the Steering Group eID discussed the proposal to develop an Introduction 
Platform eID (Introductieplateau eID) and the development of the eID System in 2016. A first 
design of the System, Agreement 1.0. (Afsprakenstelsel 1.0.), was made, based on the privacy 
by design principle. A proof of concept and a proof of technology had been conducted on the 
agreement, followed by a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). Although the PIA in general turned 
out positive, Agreement 1.0. had insufficient support from the government and market parties. 
The Ministries of Economic Affairs and of the Interior and Kingdom Relations could not 
sufficiently oversee the policy consequences of Agreement 1.0. Doubts existed on whether the 
core elements of the design could obtain sufficient political and societal support to start with 
pilots in the second half of 2015. Furthermore, there were signs that private parties, especially 
suppliers of resources, considered the system unnecessarily complex and too expensive. This 
lack of support led to the development of a new proposal by the eID Program management, in 
the form of the Introduction Platform eID. 
The Introduction Platform eID is based on eRecognition 1.9. (eHerkenning 1.9.), combined with 
a Citizen Service Number-connection register (BSN-Koppelregister). It contains the current 
‘going concern’ services of eRecognition, expanded with pilots in the citizen- and consumer 
domain. The objective of the Introduction Platform eID, ongoing from 1 January until 1 October 
2015, is: ‘delivering a working eID System, based on eRecognition 1.9., including the Citizen 
Service Number-connecting register and within which several pilots are running in production.’ 
The Introduction Platform eID will be introduced to the user under brand name ‘Idensys’. The 
pilots in the Citizen Service Number-domain are restricted to natural persons who are registered 
in the Key Registry Persons (Basisregistratie Personen) and have a legal Dutch identity 
document. During the Introduction Platform eID, DigiD remains outside the system and keeps its 
independent label. The platform enables users to login with the required level of reliability. 
Furthermore, a limited number of additional data can be exchanged, such as demonstrably 
complying with an age limit. Moreover, in the Citizen Service Number-domain, users can choose 
whether they want to login through a private or a public means (which is now only possible 
through DigiD).  
Shaping the Future of Electronic Identity  
D 32.8 
 
 
Document name: SP3/WP32 Page: 67 of 78 
Reference: 32.8 Dissemination: PU Version: Version 1 Status: Final 
 
 
Parallel to the realization of the Introduction Platform eID, the further development of the eID 
System will be prepared. Stakeholders, including the relevant Ministries164, will enter into a 
dialogue concerning functional matters and social themes, such as privacy, security, and fraud 
prevention. Based on the resulting standpoints, the outcomes of the pilots, and new 
functionalities, frameworks for further developments will be designed. The new public-private 
governance, which entered into force in May 2015, will decide what will be carried out during a 
next release of the eID system, as will be worked out in the Year Plan 2016 (Jaarplan 2016). 
In a response to the Introduction Platform eID, the Dutch Data Protection Authority (CBP) stated 
that the Dutch Data Protection Act (Wbp) has insufficiently been taken into account by the eID 
System on three points.165 First, it is unclear who is responsible for the processing of personal 
data. Second, as due to these shared responsibilities parties have only a limited view on the 
system, security incidents are difficult to discover. Last, the CBP points out that companies are 
only allowed to process Citizen Service Numbers on a legal basis, which is lacking in the eID 
System. Other parties are also concerned about the use of the Citizen Service Number as a 
pseudonym for eID users and the insufficient privacy protection with regard to eRecognition.166 
The objective for 2016 is: expanding the eID System with new functionality as well as furthering 
the dialogue on privacy, information security and fraud prevention. The objective for 2017 is: 
completing the program and transfer of the facilities, the (temporary) governance, and oversight 
to the final situation, under the then applicable (new) legislation. 
 
 Overview of legislation 10.4.2
This section will provide an overview of relevant legislation, without providing an in-depth 
analysis of how this regulation affects the Dutch eID system. As the actual design of the Dutch 
eID system is still under construction, exact implications can only be addressed when the 
blueprint of the eID system is decided upon, including all roles, technologies and functionalities. 
Logius 
In the Netherlands there is no specific Act for DigiD or more general for the current Dutch eID 
system. In 2006 a Decree was issued to establish the ‘Programmaraad GBO-Overheid’ (Besluit 
instelling Programmaraad GBO-Overheid). In 2010 the name of GBO-Overheid was changed to 
Logius and the Decree was amended accordingly. 167 A Decree was also issued to officially 
                                               
 
164
 The Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, and the Ministry of 
Security and Justice. 
165
 https://cbpweb.nl/nl/nieuws/cbp-maakt-eerste-analyse-van-eid-stelsel  
166
 Blog Hoepman http://blog.xot.nl/2015/01/29/eid-stelsel-wijzigt-koers-en-raakt-daarmee-van-de-wal-in-
de-sloot/] 
167
 Staatscourant, 2010, Nr. 784. 
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establish Logius as a temporary digital government service (Instellingsbesluit tijdelijke baten-
lastendienst Logius).168 The first of January 2013 a new Decree establishing Logius was issued, 
lifting its temporary status.169 April 24 of 2014 the Organisation Decree Logius came into force, in 
which the tasks and responsibilities of Logius are described.170  
DigiD 
Besides Decrees regarding the establishment and organisation of Logius, there is also a more 
specific Decree on the administration of DigiD (Besluit beheer DigiD).171 In this Decree it is 
stated that a minister of the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations (and for him the Director 
General Management Public Sector) is assigned the task to maintain the governmental facility 
DigiD.  
Mijnoverheid.nl 
The Dutch government has created a portal – Mijnoverheid.nl (mygovernmet.nl) – through which 
public or private organisations or persons with public tasks or authority can offer a web service. 
Dutch government has issued a Decree in which the preconditions to accede to this portal are 
established as well as the conditions of use (Besluit vaststelling aansluitvoorwaarden 
MijnOverheid.nl).172 
BSN 
The main legal acts with regard to the use of the Dutch BSN are the ‘Act on the Citizen Service 
Number’ (Wet algemene bepalingen burgerservicenummer)173 and the Act on the use of the 
Citizen Service Number in Health Care (Wet gebruik burgerservicenummer in de zorg), which 
regulates the use of the BSN in the health care domain.174  
The BSN (9-digits) does not contain any personal information. Section 8 of the Act on the 
Burger-ServiceNummer states that the body of burgomaster and alderman assigns a BSN to an 
individual immediately after registration in the Key Registry Persons. The Act on the Citizen 
Service Number defines that only ‘users’ are allowed to use the Citizen Service Number. ‘Users’ 
are defined as administrative bodies (Article 1d(1) Act on the Citizen Service Number), or any 
other to which the use of a Citizen Service Number is prescribed by law (Article 1d(2)). For 
                                               
 
168
 Staatscourant, 2010, Nr. 5480. 
169
 Staatscourant, 2012, Nr. 27097. 
170
 Staatscourant, 2014, Nr. 11520. 
171
 Staatscourant, 2006, Nr. 160. 
172
 Staatscourant, 2007, Nr. 249. 
173
 Staatsblad 2007, Nr. 444, as amended by Staatblad 2009, Nr.135, 2012, Nr. 276 and 2013 Nr. 494.  
174
 Staatsblad 2008, Nr. 186 and Nr. 482, as amanded by Staatsblad 2009, Nr. 266 and 2013, Nr. 494 
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example, an employer may make use of the number for limited purposes, for instance for tax 
purposes, but not as a general employee number.  
Besides legal acts there are several Decrees regarding the BSN: the Decree on the use of the 
Citizen Service Number in health Care (Besluit BSN in de Zorg)175 and Youth care (Besluit BSN 
in Jeugdzorg).176 There are also rules implementing the various acts regarding the Citizens 
Service Number and an Act addressing all the amendments that were needed to implement the 
Citizens Service Number (Aanpassingswet burgerservicenummer).177  
Basic Registries 
Besides rules regarding the BSN, there is also legislation regarding the Key Registries. With the 
entry into force of the Act Key Registry Persons (Wet basisregistratie personen)178, the former 
‘Act of 9 June 1994 on the Municipality Key Administration’ (Wet gemeentelijke 
basisadministratie persoonsgegevens) is revoked. The act is complemented with a Decree and 
Regulation Key Registry Persons.179 For the legal transition, both an Act and a Decree are 
established to replace references to the ‘gemeentelijke basisadministratie’ in other pieces of 
legislation with reference to the new key registries.180 
The Key Register Persons is one of the twelve key registers that is developed for the 
Netherlands: Register of Persons, Cadastral Register, Register of Companies, Register of 
Addresses, Register of Buildings, Register of Topography, Register of Vehicles, Register of 
wages, labour relations and benefits, Register Income, Register Value Immovable property, 
Register of Large Scale Topography and Register of Subsoil (geology and soil). The registries 
are all at different stages of development. So far legislation has only been issued in respect of 
the key registry persons and large scale topography.181 
Data Protection 
Other legislation relevant to eID’s is the ‘Personal Data Protection Act’ (‘Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens, Wbp)182 implementing Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
                                               
 
175
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 Staatsblad 2014, Nr. 206. 
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of personal data and on the free movement of such data.183 If the proposed Regulation such 
protection and free movement of personal data (General Data Protection Regulation) will be 
adopted and enter into force, it will replace Directive 95/46/EC and the Dutch Wbp.184  
Electronic signatures 
To implement Directive 99/93/EC and to allow the use of biometrics in passports, Dutch 
government issued the ‘2003 Electronic Signature Act’ (Wet Elektronische Handtekeningen).185 
Consequently, the usage of biometric identification schemes and digital identities in Dutch 
passports is embedded in Dutch law. In a Decree of 8 May 2003, the requirements for 
Certification Service Providers are defined. This Decree entered into force on May 21, 2003 
(Besluit elektronische handtekeningen).186 A Regulation completes the Dutch legal landscape on 
electronic signatures.187 The act, the decree and the regulation regarding electronic signatures 
will be replaced by the eIDAS Regulation that entered into force September 17, 2014. This 
Regulation will be effective July 1, 2016.188  
 Possible legal and/or technical restrictions: 10.4.3
The main legal restriction in the Netherlands regarding the alignment of the Dutch eID system 
with a pan European eID system is the fact that the DigiD uses the BurgerServiceNummer 
(BSN), a number that may only be used by the government and other institutions that are 
authorised by Dutch law to use the number. The list of users is exclusive and does not contain 
foreign institutions. This is a barrier for cross-border authentication (at least for the current 
authentication levels in use).  
As the proposed eIDAS Regulation is aimed at mutual recognition of Member State eID systems 
that are officially acknowledged by the governments of the Member States, from this perspective 
no real barriers for the accession of the Dutch eID system to a pan European system have to be 
expected. However, as the eIDAS Regulation makes government liable for damage caused by a 
malfunctioning or compromised national eID-system, and in view of the problems in the 
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 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, Official Journal L 281, 23/11/1995 P. 0031 – 0050. 
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 Proposed Regulation available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012PC0011 . In first reading the European Parliament adopted a revised 
version of the Regulation, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
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Netherlands in the past with e.g. DigiD and Diginotar, it is not likely that Dutch government will in 
short term vouch for the Dutch eID system that is currently still being developed. 
Because of the stage of development, it is difficult to predict if any technical restriction will 
emerge from the Dutch eID system in respect of a pan European setting. It is stated that use will 
be made of known and accepted standards and technologies. In this respect the technical 
connection to an eRecognition broker can be mentioned, that is established turnkey via SAAS 
(Software as a Service). The standard interface, as described in the eRecognition Trust 
Framework, is based on the open standard SAML protocol and is used by each eRecognition 
broker. This allows government agencies to switch providers without having to invest in adapting 
their systems, but might prove difficult for foreign providers using different protocols.  
 
 The national identification numbers and the eIDAS Regulation  10.5
After examination of the national eID systems and the applicable laws of four different EU 
Member States, it can be concluded that a possible legal barrier could result from the different 
legal conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier of general 
application may be processed, which is not harmonized via the Directive 95/46/EC. Most 
countries grant special protection to national identification numbers. In this regard the use of 
national identification numbers in the development of the national eIDs is a point of interest. On 
one side is the approach of the Netherlands and Belgium, which include the national 
identification number in their national eID, on the complete opposite site is Germany, which does 
not have a unique identification number, and Austria can be placed in the middle.  
In the Netherlands the currently existing scheme relies completely on the national identification 
number. Therefore only Dutch governmental entities which have access to the basic registry 
information connected to the unique identification number can be relying parties. The Dutch 
government sees this problem and anticipates to cope with this by introducing a so called a 
Citizen Service Number-connection register (BSN-Koppelregister). 
The problem of the national identification system is similar in the Belgian system. Use of the 
Belgian unique identification number is allowed if the SP obtained an authorisation from the 
privacy commission, which is only given if the SP fulfils tasks in the public interest. Therefore 
private sector parties usually do not receive an authorisation.  
The German system is completely different regarding unique identification numbers. Since 
unique and universal personal identifiers can be used to build large person profiles, they are not 
allowed in Germany. Instead, sector-specific identifiers, often valid only for a certain timeframe, 
have been used. In case of the German nPA system, the eID card contains several identification 
numbers (document number, check numbers and information on revocation). The unique 
document number is built from an identifier (first 4 characters) of the issuing authority and a 
random number (5 characters; numbers and letters). However, this unique document number 
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will not be transferred in the process of authentication. The document number changes when the 
citizen receives a new ID card. In addition, the document number, check numbers and 
information on revocation must not contain information that may support identification of the 
holder of the eID (cf. para. 5 (8) PAuswG). This is different from for example the Belgian 
approach, where the unique identification number contains personal attributes of the citizen and 
is part of the certificate.  
Austria chose a middle way. The Austrian government considered the problem of unique 
identification numbers already during the development of their eID scheme. The Austrian eID 
system does rely in principal on a unique identification number, but it has a solution integrated to 
ensure that the unique identification numbers will not be transferred or known to other parties. 
Instead of using the unique identification number itself, different unlinkable identification 
numbers are derived from the unique number. These identification numbers can also be used by 
non-governmental SPs.  
 The eIDAS Regulation 10.5.1
Regulation (EU) 910/2014 (eIDAS Regulation) recognized the problem of the different national 
eID approaches. However, it seems to consider as the main problem that Member States do not 
recognize eID schemes of other Member States, as becomes apparent from recital 9:  
“In most cases, citizens cannot use their electronic identification to authenticate 
themselves in another Member State because the national electronic identification 
schemes in their country are not recognised in other Member States. That electronic 
barrier excludes service providers from enjoying the full benefits of the internal market. 
Mutually recognised electronic identification means will facilitate cross-border provision of 
numerous services in the internal market and enable businesses to operate on a cross-
border basis without facing many obstacles in interactions with public authorities.”  
 
The Regulation intends to address two problems. The first is that citizens can’t use their 
electronic identification to authenticate themselves in another Member State because the 
national electronic identification schemes are not recognized in other Member States. This 
makes it difficult for all cross-border online services for which a higher level of trusted 
identification and authentication is necessary in order to be used, like for example cross-border 
healthcare or online public procurement. The second problem that the Regulation addresses is 
the diverging legal validity of trust services. Interesting for the question of national identification 
numbers is the first part of the Regulation regarding electronic identity.189 Since identification of 
citizens is a core national sovereignty, the Regulation does not try to introduce a common 
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European electronic identification system. Instead, it gives Member States the option to notify 
their electronic identification scheme to the Commission, which is not obligatory and only 
possible if the scheme fulfils certain criteria.190 Article 6 obliges all Member States to accept all 
notified identification means with an adequate assurance level, if their own online public services 
can be accessed by electronic identification means.191 This does provide in principle a solution to 
the problem of the legal recognition of different national eID schemes. However, the technical 
hurdle of the acceptance is still existent, since the Member States not only need to accept the 
notified eID means on paper, but also their systems need to be able to accept the different 
notified eID means. This has been addressed in article 12, which states that the notified national 
electronic identification schemes shall be interoperable, by the means of an interoperability 
framework.  
10.5.1.1 The interoperability framework: 
The eIDAS Regulation specifies criteria for the interoperability framework: The framework should 
aim to be technology neutral and not discriminate between any specific national technical 
solutions, it should follow European and international standards, facilitate the implementation of 
the principle of privacy by design and ensure that personal data is processed in accordance with 
Directive 95/46/EC.192  
Art. 12 further defines that the framework should consist of a reference to minimum technical 
requirements for the assurance levels and a mapping of the national assurance levels of notified 
eID schemes to the eIDAS assurance levels. Also reference to minimum technical requirements 
for interoperability should be made, rules of procedure and an arrangement for dispute 
resolution should be included and a provision on common operational security standards. It 
further should make reference to a minimum set of person identification data uniquely 
representing a natural or legal person, which is available from electronic identification schemes. 
This requirement is especially interesting with regards to the national identification number 
problem, since it touches upon the different national opinions regarding whether and which 
information is necessary for a unique identification of a citizen. 
The Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501193 lays down technical and 
operational requirements of the interoperability framework.194 This Regulation also specifies the 
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 Art. 12 (3) eIDAS Regulation.  
193 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/1501 of 8 September 2015 on the interoperability 
framework pursuant to Article 12(8) of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of 
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minimum ID dataset. The minimum data set for a natural person should contain the current 
family name(s), the current first name(s), the date of birth and “a unique identifier constructed by 
the sending Member State in accordance with the technical specifications for the purposes of 
cross-border identification and which is as persistent as possible in time”.195 In addition, further 
information may be transferred.196  
It is not yet clear whether the unique identifier will be national identification numbers, nor how 
exactly the different countries will apply their national unique identification number legislation to 
foreign unique identifiers. In general the national law refers specifically to the own national 
unique identification number, therefore normally the protection of the national unique 
identification number will end at the national border and foreign unique identification numbers 
will not fall under national unique identification number legislation. A foreign unique identification 
number would qualify as personal data and thus fall under the normal national data protection 
legislation.  
In general, especially considering art. 12 (3) c and d of the eIDAS Regulation, which require that 
the interoperability framework shall facilitate the implementation of the principle of privacy by 
design; and that it shall ensure that personal data is processed in accordance with Directive 
95/46/EC, the principle of data minimisation and proportionality should be considered. Therefore 
the minimum data set should be assessed on its proportionality. Especially unique identification 
numbers are a point of discussion since they allow linking of data of different data bases on the 
basis of the number.197 The advantages of a unique identification number are generally 
considered to be accurate identification of an individual, administrative efficiency, cost savings 
and the possibility to combat fraud.198 However, an assessment of proportionality also needs to 
consider the availability of other solutions. As technical solutions exist which could restrict the 
possibility of linking data across different data bases, e.g. to deduct different numbers from the 
unique identification numbers, or proving the existence of the number without revealing the 
actual number, the proportionality principle and privacy by design approach could require an 
implementation of these possibilities.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
the Council on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market 
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11. Conclusion  
The objective of this deliverable was to provide an overview of the legal provisions surrounding 
the Client service, with a focus on data protection law. The FutureID Client is a software 
component to support the user. The main legal obligation with regard to the Client is that the 
user must receive certain relevant information. This information needs to be provided by the 
controller. It is not possible to conclude only from the technical settings who will be controller(s) 
and in which regard (joint or separate). Who is controller and processor can only be decided 
from the final deployment of FutureID. To approach this problem in a differentiated manner we 
used in this deliverable three different scenarios as basis and explained the implications of these 
scenarios.  
A first step in the deployment of FutureID will therefore be to determine which actors are 
controllers for every specific data processing. The participants must agree upon a division of 
responsibilities and verify it with the national DPAs.  
The controller(s) have to ensure that the required information is provided, as has been defined in 
this deliverable. Points of attention that we would stress in this regard are: 
1. The Client must show all the required information depending on the constellation of 
controller(s) and processors (especially information on the controller and on the purpose).  
2. Consent needs to be obtained and the possibility needs to exist to revoke the consent. The 
controller needs to be able to stop processing the data when the consent will be revoked. 
3. The user must receive all the information regarding his/her rights including to whom s/he can 
turn to in order to exercise these rights. 
The proposed Data Protection Regulation includes provisions on data protection by design and 
by default. Even though they are currently not yet applicable, in the future they might require that 
the Client must always automatically select the most privacy friendly settings for the user, except 
if the user indicated otherwise.  
The second part of this deliverable examined the national eID systems and the applicable laws 
of 4 different EU Member States. This analysis provided an indication of possible legal barriers 
that could result from national legal provisions. In this regard it can be concluded that especially 
the different legal conditions under which a national identification number or any other identifier 
of general application may be processed could be a barrier.  
In the Netherlands exists at the moment no high level assurance scheme, and the existing 
scheme relies completely on the national identification number. Therefore only Dutch 
governmental entities which have access to the basic registry information connected to the 
unique identification number can be relying parties. The Dutch government is aware of the 
problem of the use of the BSN and aims to overcome this by implementing a so called Citizen 
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Service Number-connection register (BSN-Koppelregister). The eRecognition system works 
without the national unique identification number, however, currently it is restricted to only legal 
persons. The Dutch government is developing a new system, but at this stage it is not possible 
to assess whether this future system can be used with FutureID. The eIDAS Regulation might 
provide an incentive for the Dutch government to design their system more cross-border 
interoperable, however, due to the current problems with the basic registries it is unlikely that the 
Dutch government intends to notify its system in the near future.  
The problem of the national identification system is similar in the Belgian system, but use of the 
Belgian eID is allowed for private SPs, if the SP obtained an authorisation from the privacy 
commission. However, the privacy commission only gives this authorisation if the SP fulfils tasks 
in the public interest. Therefore private sector parties usually do not receive an authorisation. A 
solution is to use a hash of the unique identification number instead of the number itself. 
However, since hashing is considered use of the number, a FutureID Broker who would hash the 
number would still need to have an authorisation of the privacy commission. Another option, in 
case the FutureID Broker cannot receive an authorisation, could be to connect to a credential 
transformer that obtained an authorisation. This credential transformer could for example be a 
service of FEDICT or a PEPS of STORK, which might be implemented in the future to realize 
cross-border interoperability of the Belgian system.  
The Austrian government considered the problem of unique identification numbers during the 
development of their eID scheme. The Austrian eID system has a solution integrated to ensure 
that the unique identification number will not be used. Instead of using the unique identification 
number itself, different unlinkable identification numbers are derived from the unique number. 
These identification numbers can also be used by non-governmental SPs. The hurdle here is 
that for deriving the derived unique numbers, SPs must use their own unique number, which 
they receive upon registration in Austrian registries. Foreign SPs would either need to register in 
order to use the Austrian eID system, or use a FutureID Broker which is registered in Austria. 
The FutureID Broker could register in the Austrian registry and obtain a unique number. 
However, the FutureID Broker is not allowed to communicate the derived numbers to the SPs in 
Austria. In general it would be beneficial if the FutureID Broker ensures that different numbers 
are generated for the different SPs.  
Germany does not have a unique identification number in the nPA. Here the possible difficulty is 
the requirement of an authorisation certificate to read out the information of the user’s eID. Two 
options are possible, either the Service Provider (SP) has its own certificate, or the FutureID 
Broker has one (or several) certificates and transfers the data according to the order of the user. 
In the first case the certification authority will confirm that the Service Provider will not ask for 
more data than necessary. Another option is that the FutureID Broker would receive a certificate 
and the Service Provider would not need one. Since the purpose of the business is significant for 
obtaining the authorisation certificate, and the business should not be the transfer of data itself, 
Identity Providers who make verified data from the German eID card available to an arbitrary 
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amount of third persons would be excluded from obtaining an authorisation certificate. However, 
the significant difference to e.g. address traders is that the FutureID Broker Service will not 
provide an arbitrary amount of third parties with the user's personal data but will only process the 
user's personal data when and to the extent to which the user triggers this processing (in the 
individual case). In this case data minimisation might become a duty of FutureID. The FutureID 
Broker should ensure that the Service Provider neither asks for, nor receives more data than 
necessary for its business purpose, since otherwise the data minimisation function of the 
German eID could be undermined.   
The examples of Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands show that the national prohibitions of use 
of unique identification numbers outside of e-government can present an obstacle to the use of 
national eID means in the FutureID system. Therefore every FutureID Broker must verify which 
eID means they can support. To achieve a complete service they might need to work together 
and make contracts with other FutureID Brokers, or credential transformers which support 
different eID means. The German example shows that the FutureID Broker might need to take 
into account specific restrictions and obligations when providing service for specific 
authentication means.  
The analysis shows that the national data protection legislative systems can vary a lot. The 
proposed Data Protection Regulation potentially will provide harmonization in this regard. 
However, the current proposal does not harmonize the specific conditions for the processing of a 
national identification number or any other identifier of general application. Therefore specific 
national legislation will still apply after the introduction of the Data Protection Regulation, while 
outside the applicable national law, the general data protection provisions will apply.  
Finally the eIDAS Regulation, which includes the development of an interoperability framework 
as well as encourages possible adaptions of governments to make their eID schemes more 
cross-border friendly, can be supportive for FutureID. The influence of the eIDAS Regulation 
might help to lower the legal and technical hurdles and increase the amount of possible eID 
means that FutureID Brokers can support.  
 
